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Despite the enormous theoretical and experimental progress made so far in quantum key distri-
bution (QKD), the security of most existing QKD implementations is not rigorously established
yet. A critical obstacle is that almost all existing security proofs make ideal assumptions on the
QKD devices. Problematically, such assumptions are hard to satisfy in the experiments, and there-
fore it is not obvious how to apply such security proofs to practical QKD systems. Fortunately,
any imperfections and security-loopholes in the measurement devices can be perfectly closed by
measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD), and thus we only need to consider how to se-
cure the source devices. Among imperfections in the source devices, correlations between the sending
pulses are one of the principal problems. In this paper, we consider a setting-choice-independent
correlation (SCIC) framework in which the sending pulses can present arbitrary correlations but
they are independent of the previous setting choices such as the bit, the basis and the intensity set-
tings. Within the framework of SCIC, we consider the dominant fluctuations of the sending states,
such as the relative phases and the intensities, and provide a self-contained information theoretic
security proof for the loss-tolerant QKD protocol in the finite-key regime. We demonstrate the fea-
sibility of secure quantum communication within a reasonable number of pulses sent, and thus we
are convinced that our work constitutes a crucial step toward guaranteeing implementation security
of QKD.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] is one of the most promising applications of quantum information processing,
and it is now on the verge of global commercialization. Nonetheless, there are still several theoretical and experimental
challenges [2] that need to be addressed before its wide-scale deployment. One such challenge is the lack of practical
security proofs that bridge the gap between theory and practice. In the security proof of QKD, one typically assumes
some mathematical models for Alice and Bob’s devices. However, if these models do not faithfully capture the physical
properties of the actual QKD devices, the security of the systems is no longer guaranteed. In fact, such discrepancies
between device models assumed in security proofs and the properties of actual devices could be exploited by Eve to
attack both the source [3, 4] and the detection apparatuses [5–12]. It is therefore indispensable for realising secure
QKD to develop security proof techniques that can be applied to actual devices.
One possible approach to close this gap is to use device-independent QKD [13–16]. Its main drawback is, however,
that it delivers a quite low secret key rate with current technology, and it still requires some device characterisations 1.
An alternative solution is to use measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [19], which guarantees the security of
QKD without making any assumption on the measurement device. That is, MDI-QKD completely closes the security
loophole in the detection unit. This technique still requires, however, that certain assumptions on the source device
are satisfied.
∗ mizutani@qi.mp.es.osaka-u.ac.jp
1 Note that device-independent QKD is known to be vulnerable to memory attacks [17]. See also [18] for a possible countermeasure
against this type of attacks.
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2Unfortunately, the status of the security proofs with practical light sources is not fully satisfactory, as so far only a
few security proofs accommodate realistic imperfections in the source device. Among the imperfections in the source,
one of the crucial problems is the presence of correlations among the sending pulses. We categorize these correlations
into two types: the first type is the setting-choice-independent correlation (SCIC) where the correlation is independent
of Alice’s choices of settings such as the bit, the basis, and the intensity settings, and the second type is the setting-
choice-dependent correlation (SCDC) where the correlation is dependent on Alice’s setting choices. For instance, the
former case (SCIC) may arise when the temperature in the laser drifts slowly over time due to thermal effects, where
such drift could depend on how long we have operated a device and the ambient temperature of the room. Another
example may be found in modulation devices which are operated by power supply fluctuating in time. On the other
hand, the latter case (SCDC) occurs when the ith sending state could depend on the previous setting choices that Alice
has made up to the (i − 1)th pulse. That is to say, secret information encoded in the previous quantum signals sent
by Alice could be leaked to subsequent quantum signals sent by Alice. In other words, subsequent signals could act as
side channels for previous signals. Recently, the SCDC between the intensities of different pulses has been observed
experimentally [20]. Also, the authors of [20] conducted a security analysis which is valid for the restricted scenario
where only the nearest neighbour correlation is considered. More in general, however, the ith state could be dependent
on all the previous setting choices that Alice has made. This general correlation seems to be very hard to deal with
theoretically, and even if we would have a theoretical countermeasure against it, the characterisation of the device
might be highly non-trivial. Fortunately, it would be reasonable to assume that the SCDC could be eliminated if the
modulation devices are initialized each time after Alice emits a pulse. For instance, before Alice sends the (i + 1)th
pulse, she applies a random voltage to the modulation devices several times until the setting-choice information up to
the ith pulse which is stored in the device is deleted. This potential solution may decrease the repetition rate of the
source, however, this could be overcome by multiplexing several sources, for instance by employing integrated silicon
photonics [21–23]. With this reasonable solution, we are left with rigorously dealing with the SCIC.
In this paper, we consider the dominant fluctuations of the sending state, such as the relative phase [24–27] and
the intensity [20, 24, 28, 29] within the framework of SCIC, and we provide an information theoretic security proof
in the finite-key regime. In particular, we consider the loss-tolerant QKD protocol [30] that is a BB84 type protocol
which, unlike the standard BB84 protocol [31], has the advantage of being robust against phase modulation errors.
The loss-tolerant protocol is highly practical and has been experimentally demonstrated in both prepare & measure
QKD [26, 32] and MDI-QKD [27]. Our main contribution is to explicitly write down all the assumptions that we
impose on QKD systems, and by using only these assumptions we give a self-contained security proof. Our numerical
simulations of the key generation rate show that provably secure keys can be distributed over long distance within a
reasonable number of pulses sent, e.g, 1012 pulses.
The paper is organised as follows. In section II, we describe the assumptions that we make on Alice and Bob’s
devices and we introduce the protocol considered. In section III, we present a formula for the key generation length
of the protocol. This formula depends on certain parameters that need to be estimated; the estimation results for
these parameters are shown in section IV. Then in section V, we present our numerical simulation results for the
key generation rate. Here, we assume realistic intervals for the actual phases and intensities under the framework of
SCIC, and we show that secure communication is possible within a reasonable time frame of signal transmission, say
1012 signals. Finally, section VI summarises the paper. There are also various appendixes describing all the detailed
derivations of the parameters in the key rate.
II. ASSUMPTIONS AND PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
Here, we introduce the assumptions on Alice and Bob’s devices and the protocol we consider throughout this paper.
To describe the assumptions, we use a shorthand notation Xi := Xi, Xi−1, ..., X1 for a sequence of random variables
{Xj}ij=1 and X0 := 0. In what follows, we first summarise the assumptions we make on the sending devices as well
as those on the measurement devices, and then we move on to the description of the protocol.
A. Assumptions on Alice’s transmitter
(A-1) Assumption on the sending state ρˆi(θi, µi)Bi
We assume that Alice employs a coherent light source with a Poissonian photon number distribution in any basis,
bit and intensity setting. Here we denote by ci ∈ C := {0Z , 1Z , 0X} Alice’s bit and basis choice for the ith pulse,
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FIG. 1: A phase randomized coherent light source with SCIC (with Nsent = 3). The internal states of the source device
{gi}Nsenti=1 that determine {θi}Nsenti=1 and {µi}Nsenti=1 are setting-choice-independently correlated [see assumption (A-2)]. In each
trial, Alice inputs ci and ki to the source device, and depending on these choices and gi, the phase θi and the intensity µi are
determined. Importantly, the internal states of the source device {gi}Nsenti=1 can be arbitrary correlated with each other. Note
that the secret information contained in previous signals (namely, ci−1 and ki−1) is not leaked to subsequent signals. This
avoids the side channel problem.
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FIG. 2: This figure exemplifies the SCDC that is forbidden in our security assumptions (with Nsent = 3). It shows that the
ith internal state of the source device gi depends on the previous outcomes θi−1 and µi−1. In this case, the secret information
contained in the previous quantum signals (namely, ci−1 and ki−1) could be leaked to the ith quantum signal sent by Alice. In
other words, the ith sending signal could act as a side channel for the previous (i− 1)th signals.
and ki ∈ K := {k1, k2, k3} Alice’s intensity setting choice for the ith pulse 2. Moreover, we consider that the ith
signals are in a single-mode 3. Also, we assume that she uses phase encoding, i.e., she encodes the ith bit and
basis information into the relative phase θi between two pulses, a signal and a reference pulse, whose common phase
δ ∈ [0, 2pi) is perfectly randomized. We denote by µi the ith actual value of the intensity generated by Alice’s source.
Mathematically, given the phase and the intensity, the ith sending state ρˆi(θi, µi)Bi to Bob in the system B
i can be
described as
ρˆi(θi, µi)Bi =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
Pˆ [|ei(δ+θi)
√
µi/2〉Si |eiδ
√
µi/2〉Ri ]dδ. (1)
Here, we assume that the intensities of the signal and the reference pulses are the same and equal to µi/2 4.
In Eq. (1), we define Pˆ [|·〉] := |·〉〈·|, the subscripts Si and Ri respectively represent the optical modes of the
ith signal and reference pulse, and |eiθ√µ〉Si(Ri) denotes a coherent state in mode Si(Ri), i.e., |eiθ√µ〉Si(Ri) =
e−µ/2
∑∞
n=0(e
iθ√µ)n|n〉Si(Ri)/
√
n! with |n〉Si(Ri) being a Fock state with n photons in mode Si(Ri). Eq. (1) can be
rewritten as
ρˆi(θi, µi)Bi =
∞∑
ni=0
p(ni|µi)Pˆ [|Υˆi(θi, ni)〉Bi ], (2)
where p(ni|µi) := e−µi(µi)ni/ni! and the ni-photon state Pˆ [|Υˆi(θi, ni)〉Bi ] is defined as
Pˆ [|Υˆi(θi, ni)〉Bi ] :=
Nˆn
i
Bi ρˆ
i(θi, µi)BiNˆ
ni
Bi
tr[Nˆn
i
Bi ρˆ
i(θi, µi)Bi ]
, (3)
where Nˆn
i
Bi :=
∑ni
k=0 Pˆ [|ni − k〉Si |k〉Ri ].
2 The method introduced in this paper is general and can be applied to many different protocols. To simplify the discussion, however, we
consider the loss-tolerant three-state protocol [30] with two decoy states.
3 The single-mode condition means that each ith emitted signal can be mathematically characterised by a single creation operator. This
creation operator can, however, be different for different pulses.
4 This assumption is not mandatory. Even if the intensities of the ith signal and reference pulses differ, the security proof can be established
by introducing an additional filter operation in the security proof as explained in [30].
4Furthermore, we suppose that there are no side-channels in Alice’s source and Eve can only manipulate Bob’s
system B with her arbitrary prepared ancilla.
In the following, we first explain our correlation model for the source device, and we make assumptions on how the
phases {θi}Nsenti=1 and the intensities {µi}Nsenti=1 are determined in the source device, where Nsent denotes the number
of pulse pairs (signal and reference pulses) sent by Alice. See Fig. 1 for a schematic explanation of our correlation
model of the source device. For illustration purposes, we exemplify in Fig. 2 the setting-choice-dependent correlation
(SCDC) that is not taken into account in our security analysis.
(A-2) Assumption on the correlation: Setting-choice-independent correlation (SCIC)
The correlation model we consider is the setting-choice-independent correlation (SCIC), which means that the
internal state of the source device which determines the ith sending state is arbitrarily correlated with the previous
internal states of the source device but it does not depend on the previous setting choices made by Alice. We
denote by gi the classical random variable representing the ith internal state of the source device; it determines the
correspondence between the setting choices (ci and ki) and the output parameters from the source device (θi and µi).
We suppose that gi depends on the past internal state of the source device gi−1 and is independent of the past setting
choices and output parameters 5. Hence, if we denote the ith setting choices and output parameters by
P i := (θi, µi, ci, ki), (4)
the SCIC model can be mathematically expressed in terms of a probability distribution satisfying for any P i−1 and
gi−1 the following
p(gi|gi−1,P i−1) = p(gi|gi−1). (5)
(A-3) Assumption on the random choice of ci and ki
We assume that conditioned on the past realisation P i−1 and gi, then ci and ki are independent of each other and
also independent of P i−1 and of gi, which is expressed by the following condition
p(ci, ki|gi,P i−1) = p(ci)p(ki). (6)
(A-4) Assumption on the independence of θi and µi
We suppose that the phase θi (intensity µi) only depends on the setting choice ci (ki) and on gi. Mathematically,
this means that the probability distributions satisfy
p(θi, µi|ci, ki, gi,P i−1) = p(θi|ci, gi)p(µi|ki, gi). (7)
(A-5) Assumption on unique determination of θi and µi
The phase θi (intensity µi) is uniquely determined given gi and the setting choice ci (ki) as θici,gi (µ
i
ki,gi), that is,
θi (µi) is a function of ci (ki) and gi. This is expressed as
p(θi|ci, gi) = δ(θi, θici,gi), p(µi|ki, gi) = δ(µi, µiki,gi), (8)
where δ(x, y) denotes the Kronecker delta. Note that Eq. (8) does not impose any restriction on {gi}Nsenti=1 since there
exists the information of θi and µi somewhere in the source device, and we can take the parameters {gi}Nsenti=1 such that
{gi}Nsenti=1 uniquely determine the correspondence between {ci}ci∈C and {θici,gi}ci∈C , and {ki}ki∈K and {µiki,gi}ki∈K.
For the security analysis, we define the random variable associated to tagged events as follows.
(D-1) Definition of tagged random variable
For the internal state of the source device gi, we define the untagged set Giunt as
Giunt = {gi|∀ci ∈ C, ∀ki ∈ K, θici,gi ∈ Rc
i
ph, µ
i
ki,gi ∈ Rk
i
int}, (9)
and if gi ∈ (/∈)Giunt, we call the ith pulse the untagged (tagged) signal, which we denote by ti = u (t). In the above
definition of the untagged set, Rc
i
ph and R
ki
int respectively denote the interval of the phase for c
i and the interval of the
5 Note that since the output parameters (θi and µi) have the information of the setting choices (ci and ki), we also need to impose the
independence of gi from θi−1 and µi−1.
5intensity for ki.
(A-6) Assumption on the intervals for the phase and intensity
The ith interval of the phase Rc
i
ph is assumed to be given by
R0Zph = [θ
L
0Z , θ
U
0Z ], R
1Z
ph = [θ
L
1Z , θ
U
1Z ], R
0X
ph = [θ
L
0X , θ
U
0X ] (10)
for all instances i, where R0Zph , R
1Z
ph and R
0X
ph do not overlap each other and the parameters {θLc }c∈C and {θUc }c∈C must
satisfy −pi6 < θL0Z ≤ 0, 0 ≤ θU0Z < pi6 , 5pi6 < θL1Z ≤ pi, pi ≤ θU1Z < 7pi6 , pi3 < θL0X ≤ pi2 , and pi2 ≤ θU0X < 2pi3 . Also, the ith
interval of the intensity Rk
i
int has the form
Rkint = [µ
−
k , µ
+
k ], (11)
for all instances i, and we suppose that the following three conditions are satisfied 6: µ+k3 < µ
−
k2
, µ+k2 + µ
+
k3
< µ−k1 and
µ+k1 ≤ 1.
(A-7) Assumption on the number of tagged signals
We define the good set GNsentgood of gNsent as that whose number of tagged events ntag := |{i|gi /∈ Giunt}| is upper
bounded by a constant number Ntag as
GNsentgood := {gNsent |ntag ≤ Ntag}. (12)
We suppose that the probability of gNsent not being an element of GNsentgood is upper bounded by pfail, which is expressed
as ∑
gNsent /∈GNsentgood
p(gNsent) ≤ pfail. (13)
B. Assumptions on Bob’s measurement unit
(B-1) Assumption on basis-independent detection efficiency
We denote by {Mˆyi,bi}yi∈{0,1,∅} the ith POVM (positive operator-valued measure) for Bob’s measurement in the
basis bi ∈ B := {Z,X}, where Mˆ0,bi (Mˆ1,bi) represents the POVM element associated to the detection of the bit
value yi = 0 (1) in the basis bi, and the element Mˆ∅,bi represents the failure of outputting a bit value. We suppose
that whether a detection occurs or not for each pulse pairs does not depend on the chosen measurement basis bi; this
condition is represented as
Mˆ∅ := Mˆ∅,Z = Mˆ∅,X . (14)
(B-2) Assumption on random choice of the measurement basis
We assume that Bob measures each incoming signal in a basis bi ∈ B chosen independently of the previous basis
choices and measurement outcomes. This condition is expressed in terms of the probability distribution as
p(bi|bi−1,yi−1) = p(bi). (15)
Furthermore, we suppose that there are no side-channels in Bob’s measurement device. Let us remark that our
security model allows the use of threshold detectors; this simply implies that Bob’s Z and X basis measurements are
not necessarily measurements on a qubit space. Note also that any error in the detection apparatus (say, for example,
modulation errors) can be accommodated in our security proof as long as the assumptions stated in (B-1) and (B-2)
are satisfied.
6 These conditions are needed in the decoy-state method that is used for the parameter estimation (see Appendix D for details).
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FIG. 3: Description of the actual protocol with a typical measurement setup. In the ith trial (with 1 ≤ i ≤ Nsent), Alice’s source
device emits two consecutive coherent pulses: a signal and a reference pulse. Alice first inputs the basis and bit information
ci ∈ C and the intensity setting ki ∈ K that she selects probabilistically. Let θi and µi denote the relative phase between the
signal and the reference pulses and the total actual intensity of both pulses, respectively. On the receiving side, Bob uses a
50:50 beamsplitter (BS) to split the received pulses into two beams. Afterward, he applies a phase shift 0 or pi/2 to one of
them according to his basis choice bi = Z or bi = X, respectively. The pulses are then recombined at a 50:50 BS. A click in
the detector D0 (D1) provides Bob the bit yi = 0 (yi = 1).
C. Protocol description
In this section, we describe the protocol of which we prove the security. See Fig. 3 for a typical setup of the actual
protocol. In particular, we consider the loss-tolerant protocol [30]. Also, we suppose that Alice uses the decoy-state
method [33–35] with one signal and two decoys, and we consider asymmetric coding, i.e., the Z and X bases are
chosen with probabilities pAZ :=
∑
ci=0Z ,1Z
p(ci) and pAX := p(c
i = 0X), respectively. In addition, we assume that the
secret key is generated from those events where both Alice and Bob select the Z basis regardless of their intensity
settings.
Next, we show in detail how the protocol runs. In its description, |A| represents the cardinality of a set or length of a
bit string depending on whether A is a set or a bit string, respectively. The protocol is composed of the following steps:
0. Device characterisation and protocol parameter choice
First, Alice characterises her source to determine the value of the parameters Rcph, R
k
int for all c ∈ C and k ∈ K,
Ntag and pfail. Also, Alice and Bob decide the secrecy parameter s given by Eq. (19), the correctness parameter c,
the upper bound on Nsent which we shall denote by N , and the quantity Ndet that is associated to the termination
condition.
After this characterisation step, Alice (Bob) repeats the following step 1 (step 2) and both Alice and Bob repeat
step 3 for i = 1, ..., Nsent until the condition in the sifting step is met
7.
1. Preparation
For each i, Alice randomly selects the intensity setting ki ∈ K with probabilities pk1 := p(ki = k1), pk2 := p(ki = k2)
and pk3 := p(k
i = k3), and the basis a
i ∈ B with probabilities pAZ and pAX = 1 − pAZ . Afterward, if ai = Z she
chooses the bit information with probability 1/2; otherwise, she chooses ci = 0X . Finally, she generates the signal
and reference pulses according to her choice of ki and ci, and sends them to Bob via a quantum channel.
2. Measurement
Bob measures the incoming signal and reference pulses using the measurement basis bi ∈ B, which he selects with
probabilities pBZ := p(b
i = Z) and pBX := p(b
i = X). The outcome is recorded as {0, 1,⊥, ∅}, where ⊥ and ∅ represent,
respectively, a double click event, i.e., the two detectors click, and a no click event. If the outcome is ⊥, Bob assigns a
random bit to the event 8. As a result, Bob obtains yi ∈ {0, 1, ∅}. The outcomes 0 and 1 will be called a detection event.
3. Sifting
7 Note that we adopt the iterative sifting procedure with a basis independent termination condition, which has been recently analysed
in [36]. In this procedure, after each quantum transmission round, Bob announces whether or not the received signal produced a
detection click in his measurement apparatus. And, in the case of a detection click, both Alice and Bob announce their basis choices,
and Bob also declares his measurement outcome except for the event where both of them selected the Z basis. Then, the quantum
communication part of the protocol terminates when the basis independent termination condition is satisfied.
8 Note that this random assignment is not mandatory. Indeed, Bob can always choose a particular bit value, say 0, for the double click
events. This deterministic procedure also preserves the basis-independence detection efficiency condition described in Eq. (14).
7Bob declares over an authenticated public channel whether or not he obtained a detection event. If yes, Alice and
Bob annouce their basis choices, and Alice identifies if the event can be assigned to the following sets for all k ∈ K:
SZ,Z,k,det := {i|ai = bi = Z, ki = k, yi 6= ∅}. Moreover, if ai 6= Z or bi 6= Z, Alice asks Bob to also announce his
measurement outcome, and Alice identifies if the event can be assigned to the following sets for all c ∈ C, k ∈ K,
b ∈ B and y ∈ {0, 1}: Sc,k,det,y,b := {i|ci = c, ki = k, bi = b, yi = y}. Then, Alice checks if the following termination
condition is satisfied for a prefixed Ndet: Sdet := |Sdet| ≥ Ndet for the set Sdet = {i|yi 6= ∅}. Once this termination
condition is met after sending Nsent pulses, the results associated to the set SZ,Z,det := ∪k∈KSZ,Z,k,det form Alice
and Bob’s sifted keys κsiftA and κ
sift
B . That is, the length of these sifted keys is |κsiftA | = |κsiftB | = |SZ,Z,det|. If the
termination condition is not met after sending N pulses, then Alice and Bob abort the protocol.
4. Parameter estimation
Alice calculates a lower bound for the parameter SZ,Z,n=1,u,det := |SZ,Z,n=1,u,det|, where SZ,Z,n,u,det := {i|ai =
bi = Z, ni = n, ti = u, yi 6= ∅} is a subset of SZ,Z,det composed of those elements where Alice emitted an untagged
n-photon state. We call a lower bound on SZ,Z,1,u,det as S
L
Z,Z,1,u,det, which is given by Eq. (21). Also, she calculates
an upper-bound NUph,Z,Z,1,u,det on the number of phase errors Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det for the set SZ,Z,1,u,det, whose quantity
is given by Eq. (23). If the upper bound eUph|Z,Z,1,u,det := N
U
ph,Z,Z,1,u,det/S
L
Z,Z,1,u,det on the phase error rate
eph|Z,Z,1,u,det := Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det/SZ,Z,1,u,det satisfies eUph|Z,Z,1,u,det ≥ eUph|Z,Z,1,u,det, where eUph|Z,Z,1,u,det corresponds
to the phase error rate associated with a zero secret key rate [see Eq. (20)], Alice and Bob abort the protocol.
Otherwise, they proceed to step 5.
5. Bit error correction
Through public discussions, Bob corrects his sifted key κsiftB to make it coincide with Alice’s key κ
sift
A and obtains
κcorB (|κcorB | = |SZ,Z,det|).
6. Privacy amplification
Alice and Bob conduct privacy amplification by shortening κsiftA and κ
cor
B to obtain the final keys κ
fin
A and κ
fin
B of size
|κfinA | = |κfinB | = ` with ` given by Eq. (20).
III. SECRET KEY GENERATION LENGTH
In this section, we present a formula to compute the secret key generation length ` that guarantees that the protocol
introduced above is sec-secure. According to the universal composable security framework [37, 38], we say that a
protocol is sec-secure if it is both c-correct and s-secret where sec = c + s [39]. We say that the protocol is
c-correct if p(κ
fin
A 6= κfinB ) ≤ c holds. Also, we say that the protocol is s-secret if
1
2
||ρˆfinAE − ρˆidealAE || ≤ s (16)
holds in terms of the trace norm, where ρˆfinAE =
∑
κfinA
p(κfinA )|κfinA 〉〈κfinA |⊗ ρˆE(κfinA ) is a classical-quantum state between
Alice’s final key and Eve’s system after finishing the protocol and ρˆidealAE is an ideal state in which Alice’s key is uniformly
distributed over 2|κ
fin
A | values and decoupled from Eve’s system. We suppose that the following two conditions for the
random variables SZ,Z,1,u,det and Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det are satisfied
p(SZ,Z,1,u,det < S
L
Z,Z,1,u,det|Sdet = Ndet) ≤ Z , (17)
p(Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det > N
U
ph,Z,Z,1,u,det|ntag ≤ Ntag, Sdet = Ndet) ≤ PH (18)
regardless of Eve’s attack. In this case, for any PA > 0, by setting [40, 41]
s =
√
2
√
PA + PH + Z , (19)
it can be shown that the protocol is c-correct and s-secret if the final key length ` satisfies
` ≤ `SCIC := SLZ,Z,1,u,det
[
1− h
(
NUph,Z,Z,1,u,det
SLZ,Z,1,u,det
)]
− log2
2
PA
− λEC(c), (20)
where h(x) is the binary entropy function, and λEC(c) is the cost of error correction to achieve c-correctness.
8IV. RESULTS OF PARAMETER ESTIMATION
In this section, we summarise the estimation results of SLZ,Z,1,u,det and N
U
ph,Z,Z,1,u,det. All the detailed derivations
of these quantities can be found in Appendices D and E, respectively.
First, regarding the estimation of SLZ,Z,1,u,det, we employ the decoy-state method and we obtain the lower bound
on SZ,Z,1,u,det as
SLZ,Z,1,u,det
=
µ−k1
∑
k∈K pkµ
−
k e
−µ−k
(µ+k2 − µ−k3)(µ−k1 − µ+k2 − µ−k3)
{eµ−k2 [S−Z,Z,k2,u,det − gMA(Z,k2,uMA , pBZ , Ndet)]
pk2
− e
µ+k3 [SZ,Z,k3,det + gMA(
Z,k3,u
MA , p
B
Z , Ndet)]
pk3
− (µ
+
k2
)2 − (µ−k3)2
(µ−k1)
2
(eµ+k1 [SZ,Z,k1,det + gMA(Z,k1,uMA , pBZ , Ndet)]
pk1
)}
+ gMA(
Z,1,u
MA , p
B
Z , Ndet) (21)
except for error probability Z :=
∑
k∈K 
Z,k,u
MA + 
Z,1,u
MA + pfail for any 
Z,k,u
MA > 0 and 
Z,1,u
MA > 0. Here, we de-
fine S−Z,Z,k2,u,det := SZ,Z,k2,det − Ntag and the statistical fluctuation term in the Modified Azuma’s inequality (see
Appendix C) is given by gMA(, q, n) =
√
ln (ln −18nq)−ln 
3 .
Second, in the estimation of the number of phase errors Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det for the untagged single-photon emission
events in κsiftA , we follow the arguments in the loss-tolerant protocol in [24, 25, 30]. In the main text, for simplicity of
its expression, we only describe Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det with the following restricted phase intervals:
R0Zph = [−θ, θ], R1Zph = [pi − θ, pi + θ], R0Xph =
[pi
2
− θ, pi
2
+ θ
] (
with 0 ≤ θ < pi
6
)
. (22)
Note that the expression of Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det with the general phase intervals in Eq. (10) should be refereed to Ap-
pendix E 2. Under the assumption of Eq. (22), NUph,Z,Z,1,u,det can be written as a linear combination of the parameters
S′c,1,u,det,y,X , which are bounds on the cardinality of the sets Sc,1,u,det,y,X = {i|ci = c, ni = 1, ti = u, bi = X, yi = y)},
as
NUph,Z,Z,1,u,det =
pAZp
B
Z (1 + sin θ)
2
1∑
y=0
∑
c∈C
ΓUy,c
S′c,1,u,det,y⊕1,X + sgn(Γ
U
y,c)gA(Ndet, 
c,1,u,y,X
A )
p(c)pBX
+ gA(Ndet, 
ph,Z,1,u
A ).
(23)
Here, we define the statistical fluctuation term of the Azuma’s inequality [42] as gA(x, y) :=
√
2x ln 1/y and the
functions {ΓUy,c}y,c [25] as ΓU0,0Z = sin θsin θ+cos 32 θ (0 ≤ Γ
U
0,0Z <
√
2 − 1), ΓU0,1Z = ΓU0,0Z , ΓU0,0X = 1−sin θcos 2θ−sin θ (1 ≤ ΓU0,0X <
∞), ΓU1,0Z = cos θcos θ−sin 32 θ (1 ≤ Γ
U
1,0Z < 3 +
√
6), ΓU1,1Z = Γ
U
1,0Z and Γ
U
1,0X = − 1−sin θ1+sin θ (−1 ≤ ΓU1,0X < −1/3). Regarding
S′c,1,u,det,y,X , we take the following upper or lower bounds on Sc,1,u,det,y,X := |Sc,1,u,det,y,X |, depending on the sign of
ΓUy,c, such that Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det takes its upper bound:
S′c,1,u,det,y,X =
{
SUc,1,u,det,y,X if Γ
U
y,c > 0,
SLc,1,u,det,y,X if Γ
U
y,c ≤ 0,
(24)
with
SUc,1,u,det,y,X : =
[Sc,k2,det,y,X+gMA(
c,k2,u,y,X
MA ,p
B
X ,Ndet)]e
−µ−
k3
pk2
− [S
−
c,k3,u,det,y,X
−gMA(c,k3,u,y,XMA ,pBX ,Ndet)]e
−µ+
k2
pk3
e−µ
−
k2
−µ−k3µ−k2 − e
−µ+k2−µ
+
k3µ+k3
×
∑
k∈K
pkµ
+
k e
−µ+k + gMA(
c,1,u,y,X
MA , p
B
X , Ndet) (25)
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FIG. 4: The key rate (per pulse) in logarithmic scale versus fibre length for the case with the phase fluctuation of ±0.03 rad
[namely, θ = 0.03 in Eq. (22)] for any choice of ci ∈ C and the intensity fluctuation of ±3% for the choice of ki ∈ {k1, k2} and
Rk3int = [0, 10
−3] for the weakest decoy setting ki = k3. In solid lines, we assume (I) Ntag=0 and pfail = 0, and in the dashed
lines, we assume (II) Ntag = Nsent × 10−7 and pfail = 0. The secrecy and correctness parameters are s = c = 10−10 and
for each set of solid and dashed lines, the total number of signals sent by Alice is Nsent ∈ {1010, 1010.5, 1011, 1011.5, 1012} from
left to right. The rightmost solid and dashed lines respectively correspond to the asymptotic key rate of the cases (I) and (II)
where no statistical flucuation terms in NUph,Z,Z,1,u,det and S
L
Z,Z,1,u,det are taken into account. The experimental parameters
are described in the main text.
and
SLc,1,u,det,y,X : =
µ−k1
∑
k∈K pkµ
−
k e
−µ−k
(µ+k2 − µ−k3)(µ−k1 − µ+k2 − µ−k3)
{eµ−k2 [S−c,k2,u,det,y,X − gMA(c,k2,u,y,XMA , pBX , Ndet)]
pk2
− e
µ+k3 [Sc,k3,det,y,X + gMA(
c,k3,u,y,X
MA , p
B
X , Ndet)]
pk3
− (µ
+
k2
)2 − (µ−k3)2
(µ−k1)
2
(eµ+k1 [Sc,k1,det,y,X + gMA(c,k1,u,y,XMA , pBX , Ndet)]
pk1
)}
+ gMA(
c,1,u,y,X
MA , p
B
X , Ndet), (26)
where S−c,k,u,det,y,X := Sc,k,det,y,X−Ntag. Finally, we calculate the failure probability PH associated to the estimation
of NUph,Z,Z,1,u,det in Eq. (18), as PH = 
1
PH + 
2
PH, and we define 
1
PH :=
∑1
y=0
∑
c∈C 
c,1,u,y,X
A + 
ph,Z,1,u
A for any
c,1,u,y,XA > 0 and 
ph,Z,1,u
A > 0. 
2
PH, on the other hand, is composed of the failure probabilities associated to
the estimation of {Sc,1,u,det,y,X}y=0,1,c∈C , and 2PH has the form 2PH =
∑
y=0,1
∑
c∈C 
c,1,u,y,X with c,1,u,y,X =∑
k=k2,k3
c,k,u,y,XMA + 
c,1,u,y,X
MA or 
c,1,u,y,X =
∑
k∈K 
c,k,u,y,X
MA + 
c,1,u,y,X
MA depending on whether we use the upper
bound given by Eq. (25) or the lower bound given by Eq. (26).
V. SIMULATION OF THE KEY RATE
In this section, we show the numerical simulation results of the key rate for a fibre-based QKD system. In the
simulation, we assume that Bob uses a measurement setup with two single-photon detectors with detection efficiency
ηdet = 10% and dark count probability per pulse pdark = 10
−5. These parameters are set to be the same as those
in [43]. The attenuation coefficient of the optical fibre is 0.2 dB/km and its transmittance is ηch = 10
−0.2l/10 with
l denoting the fibre length. We denote the channel transmission rate including detection efficiency by η := ηchηdet.
The overall misalignment error of the measurement system is fixed to be emis = 1%. In addition, we assume an
error correction cost equals to λEC(c) = 1.05 × |κsiftA |h(ebit) + log2(1/c), where ebit is the bit error rate of the
sifted key (κsiftA ,κ
sift
B ). Moreover, we suppose that the intervals of the intensity fluctuation in Eq. (11) are given by
Rkint = [µk(1−rk), µk(1+rk)] for k ∈ {k1, k2} and Rk3int = [0, 10−3] with µk denoting the expected intensity (we suppose
that µk3 = 0) and where rk represents the deviation of the actual intensity from the expected value. For the intervals
of the phase fluctuation Rc
i
ph in Eq. (22), we take the experimental value of phase modulation error from Ref. [26] and
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we set θ = 0.03 rad 9. In Fig. 4, we consider the two cases: (I) Ntag = 0 and pfail = 0 and (II) Ntag = Nsent × 10−7
and pfail = 0. The case (I) means that all the phases and the intensities lie in their intervals, and the case (II) means
that the number of tagged events is upper bounded by Nsent × 10−7.
Regarding the numbers of detection events SZ,Z,k,det and Sc,k,det,y,b, we generate these quantities by assuming the
following specific setup. In particular, for the ith trial, we consider that Alice sends Bob pairs of coherent states
through the fibre of the form |ei(δ+θc)√µk/2〉Si |eiδ√µk/2〉Ri with θ0Z = 0, θ1Z = pi and θ0X = pi/2 according to the
choices of ki = k ∈ K and ci = c ∈ C 10. Bob measures the incoming signals using a Mach-Zehnder interferometer with
two 50:50 BSs and a phase modulator as shown in Fig. 3. More precisely, he uses a first 50:50 BS to split the received
pulses into two beams, and after that he applies a phase shift 0 or pi/2 to one of them according to his basis choice
of bi = Z or bi = X, respectively, and finally he lets interfere the resulting pulses using a second 50:50 BS. In this
setup, we obtain the following probabilities: p(yi = y|ci = yZ , ki = k, bi = Z) = p(yi = 0|ci = 0X , ki = k, bi = X) =
[1−e− ηµk2 (1−pd)](1− pd2 ), p(yi = y⊕1|ci = yZ , ki = k, bi = Z) = p(yi = 1|ci = 0X , ki = k, bi = X) = pd[1+e
− ηµk
2 (1−pd)]
2
for y ∈ {0, 1}, and p(yi = y|ci = xZ , ki = k, bi = X) = p(yi = y|ci = 0X , ki = k, bi = Z) = 1−(1−pd)
2e−
ηµk
2
2 for
y, x ∈ {0, 1}. Moreover, we assume that the bit error rate ebit is given by ebit =
∑
y=0,1 p(y
i = y ⊕ 1|ci = yZ , ki =
k1, b
i = Z)/
∑
x,y=0,1 p(y
i = y|ci = xZ , ki = k1, bi = Z) + emis. With these probabilities, we suppose that the
experimentally observed numbers satisfy SZ,Z,k,det = Nsent
∑
x,y=0,1
pAZ
2 p
B
Zpk × p(yi = y|ci = xZ , ki = k, bi = Z) and
Sc,k,det,y,b = Nsentp(c)p
B
b pk × p(yi = y|ci = c, ki = k, bi = b).
With the above parameters, we simulate the key rate `SCIC/Nsent for a fixed value of the correctness and secrecy
parameters c = s = 10
−10 and we set Z = 1/2 × 10−10, PA = PH = 1/16 × 10−20, and Z,k,uMA = Z,1,uMA =
Z/4 = 1/8 × 10−10. We also assume that each failure probability which is contained in the expression of 1PH and
2PH takes the value 
c,1,u,y,X
A = 
ph,Z,1,u
A = 1/26 × PH and c,k,u,y,XMA = c,1,u,y,XMA = 1/26 × PH, respectively, and we
set pAZ = p
B
Z = pk1 = 0.8 and pk2 = 0.1. In the simulation, we perform a numerical optimization of the key rate
`SCIC/Nsent over the two free parameters µk1 and µk2 . In the solid and dashed lines in Fig. 4, we respectively plot the
key rate of the cases (I) and (II) for the finite-case when Nsent ∈ {1010, 1010.5, 1011, 1011.5, 1012} (from left to right).
For comparison, the rightmost solid and dashed lines respectively correspond to the asymptotic key rate of the cases
(I) and (II), where no statistical fluctuation terms in Eqs. (21) and (23) are taken into account. Our simulation results
show the feasibility of secure key distribution within a reasonable time by employing practical devices that satisfy
our device assumptions. For instance, if Alice uses a laser diode operating at 1 GHz repetition rate and she sends
Nsent = 10
12 signals, then we find that it is possible to distribute a 1-Mb secret key over a 75-km fibre link in < 0.3
hours. This scenario corresponds to the solid blue line (the fifth solid line from the left) shown in Fig. 4.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have provided an information theoretic security proof for the loss-tolerant QKD protocol which
accommodates the setting-choice-independent correlation (SCIC) in the finite key regime. Within the framework of
SCIC, the relative phases and intensities of the sending coherent states fluctuate over time. Once realistic intervals for
these fluctuations (such as for instance ±0.03 rad and ±3%, respectively) are guaranteed, our numerical simulations
have shown that secure quantum communication is feasible with a reasonable number of signal transmissions such
as for example Nsent = 10
12. Therefore, our results constitute a significant step toward realising secure quantum
communication with practical source devices. On a more general outlook, it would be of great practical interest to
improve the convergence speed of the key rate in the finite-key regime and it would be also important to weaken the
requirements for Alice’s source device which could lead to a simpler characterisation of the source devices.
9 Note that the phase fluctuation ±0.03 rad is the largest experimental value observed in [26] in a protocol that uses the three states
{0, pi/2, 3pi/2} (see table III in [26]). Note also that the authors of [26] measured a different quantity than the one we need here. More
precisely, Ref. [26] assumes that each sending pulse is independent and identically distributed (IID) and measured the fixed deviation
due to imperfect encoding. In contrast, we allow each pulse to be different (non-IID case) and we are interested in the deviation of
each pulse from the mean. In our simulation, we simply assume that the result in Ref. [26] gives us some reasonable estimation on the
deviation θ.
10 Note that this assumption is used just to simulate the experimentally observed numbers (namely, SZ,Z,k,det and Sc,k,det,y,b), and we
do not require this assumption in the actual experiments.
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Appendix A: Summary of notations
A list of the parameters used throughout this paper together with their notation is provided in Tables I and II.
Random variables and sets Meaning
Xi Abbreviation of X1, X2, ..., Xi
(Xi can be ci, ki, θi, µi, P i, gi, ni, yi, bi)
C Set of bit and basis information: {0Z , 1Z , 0X}
ci ∈ C Alice’s ith choice of bit and basis information
K Set of intensity setting: {k1, k2, k3}
ki ∈ K Alice’s ith choice of intensity setting
θi ∈ [0, 2pi) ith relative phase between the signal and reference pulses
µi ∈ [0,∞) ith total intensity in both the signal and reference pulses
Giunt Untagged set of the ith internal state of the source device
gi ∈ Giunt ∪ Giunt ith internal state of Alice’s source device
g≥i Abbreviation of gi, gi+1, ..., gNsent
ti ∈ {u, t} Indicator of gi ∈ Giunt or gi /∈ Giunt: ti = u if gi ∈ Giunt and ti = t if gi /∈ Giunt
ntag Number of tagged signals: |{i|ti = t}|
GNsentgood Set of gNsent where ntag is upper bounded by a fixed number
ni ∈ [0,∞) Total number of photons in the ith signal and reference pulses
B Set of bases: {Z,X}
ai(bi) ∈ B Alice’s (Bob’s) ith basis choice
yi ∈ {0, 1, ∅} Bob’s ith measurement outcome
SZ,Z,k,det Set {i|ai = bi = Z, ki = k, yi 6= ∅}
SZ,Z,det Set {i|ai = bi = Z, yi 6= ∅}
SZ,Z,n,u,det Set {i|ai = bi = Z, ni = n, ti = u, yi 6= ∅}
Sc,k,det,y,b Set {i|ci = c, ki = k, bi = b, yi = y}
Sc,n,u,det,y,b Set {i|ci = c, ni = n, ti = u, bi = b, yi = y}
Sdet Set {i|yi 6= ∅}
SLZ,Z,1,u,det Lower bound on |SZ,Z,1,u,det|
Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det Number of phase errors in the set SZ,Z,1,u,det
NUph,Z,Z,1,u,det Upper bound on Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det
TABLE I: Random variables and sets used throughout the paper
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Quantum systems Meaning
Ci Quantum system storing ci possessed by Alice
Ki Quantum system storing ki possessed by Alice
Θi Quantum system storing θi possessed by Alice
M i Quantum system storing µi possessed by Alice
Gi Quantum system storing gi possessed by Alice
N i Quantum system storing ni possessed by Alice
Bi ith quantum system sent to Bob
Ai Alice’s ith quantum system defined iff ti = u and ni = 1
B′i Bob’s ith quantum system after Eve’s intervention
Symbols Meaning
Nsent Number of pulse pairs (signal and reference pulses) sent by Alice
Rc
i
ph i
th interval of the relative phase θi for ci
Rk
i
int i
th interval of the intensity µi for ki
Ntag Predetermined upper bound on ntag
pfail Upper bound on the probability that g
Nsent /∈ GNsentgood occurs
Ndet Predetermined number of detection events |Sdet|
κsiftA(B) Alice’s (Bob’s) sifted key
κcorB Bob’s reconciled key
κfinA(B) Alice’s (Bob’s) final key
sec Security parameter of the protocol
s Secrecy parameter of the protocol
c Correctness parameter of the protocol
PA Error probability of privacy amplification
Z Failure probability of the estimation of SLZ,Z,1,u,det given that Sdet = Ndet
PH Failure probability of the estimation of N
U
ph,Z,Z,1,u,det given that ntag ≤ Ntag and Sdet = Ndet
` Length (in bits) of the final key
TABLE II: Quantum systems and symbols used throughout the paper
Appendix B: Description of Alice’s sending state
For later discussions, we introduce the following theorem about the description of Alice’s sending states, which is
a direct consequence of the assumptions (A-1)-(A-5) in Sec. II A.
Theorem 1 From the assumptions (A-1)-(A-5), we have that all the Nsent sending states can be written as
∑
gNsent
√
p(gNsent)|gNsent〉GNsent
Nsent⊗
i=1
∑
ci,ki
√
p(ci)p(ki)|ρˆi(θici,gi , µiki,gi)〉NiBi |ci, ki〉CiKi |θici,gi , µiki,gi〉Θi,Mi (B1)
with GNsent := G1, ..., GNsent . Here, Gi, Ci, Ki, Θi and M i denote the systems storing the information of gi, ci, ki,
θi and µi, respectively. According to the assumption (A-1), note that these five systems are possessed by Alice. This
is to ensure that there is no side channel leaking information to Eve. Also, |ρˆi(θici,gi , µiki,gi)〉NiBi is a purified state of
Eq. (2) with N i being a system storing the number of photons contained in the ith sending state, which has the form
|ρˆi(θici,gi , µiki,gi)〉NiBi =
∑
ni
√
p(ni|µiki,gi)|ni〉Ni |Υˆi(θici,gi , ni)〉Bi . (B2)
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Proof of Theorem 1 For the most general case, the total Nsent sending states can be coherently written as
∑
gNsent ,θNsent ,µNsent ,cNsent ,kNsent
√
p(gNsent ,PNsent)
Nsent⊗
i=1
|ρˆi(θi, µi)〉Ni,Bi |θi〉Θi |µi〉Mi |ci〉Ci |ki〉Ki |gi〉Gi . (B3)
Next, we calculate p(gNsent ,PNsent) using the assumptions (A-2)-(A-5).
p(gNsent ,PNsent) = ΠNsenti=1 p(g
i, P i|gi−1,P i−1) (B4)
= ΠNsenti=1 p(P
i|gi,P i−1)p(gi|gi−1,P i−1) (B5)
= ΠNsenti=1 p(P
i|gi,P i−1)p(gi|gi−1) (B6)
= ΠNsenti=1 p(θ
i, µi|ci, ki, gi,P i−1)p(ci, ki|gi,P i−1)p(gi|gi−1) (B7)
= ΠNsenti=1 δ(θ
i, θici,gi)δ(µ
i, µiki,gi)p(c
i)p(ki)p(gi|gi−1), (B8)
where in the 3rd equation we use the assumption (A-2), and in the 5th equation we use the assumptions (A-3)-(A-5).
With this expression, Eq. (B3) results in Eq. (B1), which ends the proof. 
Appendix C: Modified Azuma’s inequality
Here, we introduce the Modified Azuma’s inequality [44] that we use in the decoy-state method (see Appendix D).
Theorem 2 (Modified Azuma’s inequality) [44]. Let Yi be an i
th random variable with Y0 := 0 (0 ≤ i ≤ n) defined
on the probability space (Ω,F , p) with the filtration F0 ⊂ F1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Fn = F , where F0 is the trivial σ-algebra {∅,Ω}
and F is the power set of Ω (consisting of all the subsets of Ω). We suppose that the sequence of random variables
{Yj}nj=1 satisfies
E[Yj |Fj ] = Yj , (C1)
the Martingale condition:
E[Yj |Fj−1] = Yj−1, (C2)
the bounded difference condition:
|Yj − Yj−1| ≤ 1, (C3)
and the zero-difference condition:
p(|Yj − Yj−1| = 0|Fj−1) ≥ 1− q (C4)
for a constant q (0 ≤ q ≤ 1). Then, for any  > 0, we have that
p
(
Yn ≥ gMA(, q, n)
)
≤  (C5)
and
p
(
Yn ≤ −gMA(, q, n)
)
≤  (C6)
are satisfied, where gMA(, q, n) is defined by
gMA(, q, n) :=
√
ln (ln − 18nq)− ln 
3
. (C7)
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For completeness, below we prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2 For convenience, we define ∆j := Yj − Yj−1, and we have that for any s > 0
E[es∆j |Fj−1] = E[1 + s∆j + s2∆2jg(s∆j)|Fj−1] (C8)
= 1 + s2E[∆2jg(s∆j)|Fj−1] (C9)
≤ 1 + s2g(s)E[∆2j |Fj−1] (C10)
≤ 1 + s2g(s)q (C11)
≤ es2g(s)q, (C12)
where g(x) := (ex − 1 − x)/x2 with g(0) = 1/2. Here, in Eq. (C9) we use Eqs. (C1) and (C2), in Eq. (C10) we use
Eq. (C3) and the fact that g(x) is a monotonically increasing function, and finally in Eq. (C11) we use Eqs. (C3) and
(C4). We also have that for any t > 0,
p(Yn ≥ t) ≤ e−stE[esYn ] (C13)
= e−stE[E[es(Yn−1+∆n)|Fn−1]] (C14)
= e−stE[esYn−1E[es∆n |Fn−1]] (C15)
≤ es2g(s)qe−stE[esYn−1 ] (C16)
≤ · · · (C17)
≤ e−stΠni=1es
2g(s)q (C18)
= e−st+(e
s−1−s)qn. (C19)
Here, Eq. (C13) is due to the Markov’s inequality, Eq. (C14) is due to the tower rule of expectation, Eq. (C15) is due
to Eq. (C1), Eq. (C16) is due to Eq. (C12), and in Eq. (C17) we just employ the same discussion that we used to go
from Eq. (C14) to Eq. (C16) to bound E[esYn−1 ]. If we choose s = ln(1 + tnq ), we obtain from Eq. (C19) that
p(Yn ≥ t) ≤ e−nqφ( tnq ) (C20)
with φ(x) := (1 + x) ln(1 + x)− x. Finally, since φ(x) ≥ x22(1+x/3) for x > −1, we obtain
p(Yn ≥ t) ≤ exp
(
− t
2
2nq + 2t/3
)
. (C21)
By setting exp
(
− t22nq+2t/3
)
= , we obtain Eq. (C5). Also, Eq. (C6) can be proven in a similar way. 
Appendix D: Decoy-state method
In this Appendix, we present the decoy-state method that we use to estimate bounds on the parameters Sc,n,u,det,y,X
and SZ,Z,n,u,det for n = 1 in the presence of intensity fluctuations within the framework of SCIC. Here, Sc,n,u,det,y,X
denotes the cardinality of the set Sc,n,u,det,y,X = {i|ci = c, ni = n, ti = u, bi = X, yi = y} (with y ∈ {0, 1}). More
precisely, the goal here is to bound the quantities
Sc,n=1,u,det,y,X and SZ,Z,n=1,u,det (D1)
with the available experimentally observed data, that is,
{Sc,k,det,y,X}k∈K and {SZ,Z,k,det}k∈K, (D2)
respectively. We first derive the upper and lower bounds on Sc,1,u,det,y,X (see Sec. D 1), and after that we derive the
lower bound on SZ,Z,1,u,det (see Sec. D 2).
To achieve this goal, we divide the task into four steps. To illustrate the method, let us consider for instance
the case for Sc,1,u,det,y,X . In step 1, we use the Modified Azuma’s inequality to relate the numbers Sc,1,u,det,y,X
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and Sc,k,u,det,y,X with the quantities 〈Sc,1,u,y,X〉det in Eq. (D11) and 〈Sc,k,u,y,X〉det in Eq. (D3), respectively. Here,
Sc,k,u,det,y,X denotes the cardinality of the set Sc,k,u,det,y,X = {i|ci = c, ki = k, ti = u, bi = X, yi = y}. In step 2,
we derive the bounds on 〈Sc,k,u,y,X〉det by using the functions {fc,n,u,y,X|det}n that are related to the quantities{〈Sc,n,u,y,X〉det}n. Here, 〈Sc,n,u,y,X〉det and fc,n,u,y,X|det are defined in Eqs. (D11) and (D22) respectively. In step 3,
we derive the bounds on 〈Sc,n=1,u,y,X〉det with {〈Sc,k,u,y,X〉det}k. In step 4, we finally combine Eqs. (D25) and (D30)
with Eqs. (D10) and (D12) which are obtained by means of the Modified Azuma’s inequality, and we obtain the
bounds on Sc,n=1,u,det,y,X with the observed data {Sc,k,det,y,X}k∈K.
1. Upper and lower bounds on Sc,1,u,det,y,X
a. Step 1. Modified Azuma’s inequality
In order to obtain upper and lower bounds on Sc,1,u,det,y,X , we first relate the numbers Sc,1,u,det,y,X and Sc,k,u,det,y,X
with the quantities 〈Sc,1,u,y,X〉det and 〈Sc,k,u,y,X〉det, respectively. In the discussion, we use a shorthand notation
χi−1AB := χ
i−1
A ,χ
i−1
B with χ
i−1
A = (c
i−1,ki−1, gi−1,ni−1) and χi−1B = (b
i−1,yi−1), and 〈Sc,k,u,y,X〉det is defined as
〈Sc,k,u,y,X〉det =
∑
i∈Sdet
p(ci = c, ki = k, ti = u, yi = y|χi−1AB , yi 6= ∅, bi = X)δ(bi, X). (D3)
Here, δ(x, y) denotes the Kronecker delta. To relate Eq. (D3) with the number Sc,k,u,det,y,X , we introduce the following
random variable
Y jc,k,u,y,X := Λ
j
c,k,u,y,X −
∑
i∈Sjdet
p(ci = c, ki = k, ti = u, yi = y|χi−1AB , yi 6= ∅, bi = X)δ(bi, X), (D4)
where Sjdet is the set containing the first j elements of the set Sdet, and Λjc,k,u,y,X denotes the number of instances
where (c, k, u,X, y) is realised among the set Sjdet, namely, Λjc,k,u,y,X =
∑
i∈Sjdet δ(c
i, c)δ(ki, k)δ(ti, u)δ(yi, y)δ(bi, X).
Then, the random variables {Y jc,k,u,y,X}Ndetj=1 satisfy Eq. (C1), the Martingale condition [see Eq. (C2)], the bounded
difference condition [see Eq. (C3)] and the zero-difference condition [see Eq. (C4)] 11 :
p(|Y jc,k,u,y,X − Y j−1c,k,u,y,X | = 0|Fj−1) ≥ 1− pBX . (D6)
11 This statement can be proven as follows. Since Y jc,k,u,y,X − Y j−1c,k,u,y,X is written as
Y jc,k,u,y,X − Y j−1c,k,u,y,X =
∑
i∈Sj
det
\Sj−1
det
[
δ(ci, c)δ(ki, k)δ(ti, u)δ(yi, y)− p(ci = c, ki = k, ti = u, yi = y|χi−1AB , yi 6= ∅, bi = X)
]
δ(bi, X),
(D5)
we can confirm that the Martingale condition
E[Yj − Yj−1|Fj−1] = E
 ∑
i∈Sj
det
\Sj−1
det
[
δ(ci, c)δ(ki, k)δ(ti, u)δ(yi, y)− p(ci = c, ki = k, ti = u, yi = y|χi−1AB , yi 6= ∅, bi = X)
]
δ(bi, X)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Fj−1

=
∑
i∈Sj
det
\Sj−1
det
p(ci = c, ki = k, ti = u, yi = y|χi−1AB , yi 6= ∅, bi = X)p(bi = X|χi−1AB , yi 6= ∅)
−
∑
i∈Sj
det
\Sj−1
det
p(ci = c, ki = k, ti = u, yi = y|χi−1AB , yi 6= ∅, bi = X)p(bi = X|χi−1AB , yi 6= ∅)
= 0
holds. Also, Eq. (D5) assures the bounded difference condition: |Yj−Yj−1| ≤ 1. Finally, from Eq. (D5) and using the assumptions (B-1)
and (B-2), we obtain the zero-difference condition in Eq. (D6) as p(|Y jc,k,u,y,X − Y j−1c,k,u,y,X | = 0|Fj−1) ≥ p(
∑
i∈Sj
det
\Sj−1
det
δ(bi, X) =
0|Fj−1) = 1− pBX .
16
Here, we identify the filtration Fj−1 with the random variables (χmax{i|i∈S
j
det}−1
AB ). Therefore, we can apply the
Modified Azuma’s inequality in Eqs. (C5) and (C6), and we obtain
p
(
Sc,k,u,det,y,X − 〈Sc,k,u,y,X〉det ≥ gMA(c,k,u,y,XMA , pBX , Ndet)
)
≤ c,k,u,y,XMA (D7)
and
p
(
Sc,k,u,det,y,X − 〈Sc,k,u,y,X〉det ≤ −gMA(c,k,u,y,XMA , pBX , Ndet)
)
≤ c,k,u,y,XMA . (D8)
Here, c,k,u,y,XMA denotes the failure probability associated to the estimation of 〈Sc,k,u,y,X〉det, and the function
gMA(
c,k,u,y,X
MA , p
B
X , Ndet) is defined in Eq. (C7). Note that the quantity Sc,k,u,det,y,X in Eqs. (D7) and (D8) is not
directly observed in the actual experiments, and we only know its range, given that the number of tagged signals ntag
is upper bounded by Ntag, as
S−c,k,u,det,y,X := Sc,k,det,y,X −Ntag ≤ Sc,k,u,det,y,X ≤ Sc,k,det,y,X , (D9)
where Sc,k,det,y,X := |Sc,k,det,y,X |. By combining Eqs. (D7), (D8) and (D9), we obtain
S−c,k,u,det,y,X − gMA(c,k,u,y,XMA , pBX , Ndet) ≤ 〈Sc,k,u,y,X〉det ≤ Sc,k,det,y,X + gMA(c,k,u,y,XMA , pBX , Ndet) (D10)
except for error probability 2c,k,u,y,XMA . The bounds on Sc,n=1,u,det,y,X will be expressed as a function of the rhs and
the lhs of Eq. (D10).
Next, we define the quantity 〈Sc,n,u,y,X〉det that will be related to the number Sc,n,u,det,y,X through the Modified
Azuma’s inequality as
〈Sc,n,u,y,X〉det :=
∑
i∈Sdet
p(ci = c, ni = n, ti = u, yi = y|χi−1AB , yi 6= ∅, bi = X)δ(bi, X), (D11)
and we follow the above arguments about the Modified Azuma’s inequality. As a result, we obtain
〈Sc,n,u,y,X〉det − gMA(c,n,u,y,XMA , pBX , Ndet) ≤ Sc,n,u,det,y,X ≤ 〈Sc,n,u,y,X〉det + gMA(c,n,u,y,XMA , pBX , Ndet) (D12)
except for error probability 2c,n,u,y,XMA .
From Eqs. (D10) and (D12) obtained by means of the Modified Azuma’s inequality, we find that the remaining
task is to bound 〈Sc,1,u,y,X〉det with {〈Sc,k,u,y,X〉det}k such that Sc,1,u,det,y,X can be bounded by the observed data
appearing in Eq. (D10). Next, in step 2, we relate the expectation 〈Sc,k,u,y,X〉det with {〈Sc,n,u,y,X〉det}n through some
functions {fc,n,u,y,X|det}n, and then by using this relation we bound 〈Sc,1,u,y,X〉det with {〈Sc,k,u,y,X〉det}k in step 3.
b. Step 2. Upper and lower bounds on 〈Sc,k,u,y,X〉det with {fc,n,u,y,X|det}n
In this step, we bound 〈Sc,k,u,y,X〉det in Eq. (D3) with {〈Sc,n,u,y,X〉det}n through the functions {fc,n,u,y,X|det}n. In
the following discussion, we use the notation g≥i := gi, gi+1, ..., gNsent .
First, from the law of total probability, the definition (D-1) in Sec. II A and Bayes’ theorem, Eq. (D3) can be
rewritten as
〈Sc,k,u,y,X〉det =
∑
i∈Sdet
∑
n
∑
gi∈Giunt
∑
g≥i+1
p(ci = c, ki = k, ni = n, g≥i, yi = y|χi−1AB , yi 6= ∅, bi = X)δ(bi, X)
=
∑
i∈Sdet
∑
n
∑
gi∈Giunt
∑
g≥i+1
p(ki = k|ci = c, ni = n, g≥i, yi 6= ∅, yi = y,χi−1AB , bi = X)
× p(ci = c, ni = n, g≥i, yi = y|χi−1AB , yi 6= ∅, bi = X)δ(bi, X). (D13)
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Next, we calculate the first factor of Eq. (D13) to obtain Eq. (D20) below.
p(ki = k|ci = c, ni = n, g≥i, yi 6= ∅, yi = y,χi−1AB , bi = X)
=p(ki = k|ci = c, ni = n, g≥i,χi−1AB , bi = X) (D14)
=p(ki = k|ci = c, ni = n, g≥i,χi−1AB ) (D15)
=p(ki = k|ci = c, ni = n, g≥i,χi−1A ) (D16)
=
p(ni = n|ci = c, ki = k, g≥i,χi−1A )p(ki = k|ci = c, g≥i,χi−1A )
p(ni = n|ci = c, g≥i,χi−1A )
(D17)
=
pkp(n
i = n|ci = c, ki = k, g≥i,χi−1A )∑
k′ pk′p(n
i = n|ci = c, ki = k′, g≥i,χi−1A )
(D18)
=
pk
∑
µi p(n
i = n|ci = c, ki = k, g≥i,χi−1A , µi)p(µi|ci = c, ki = k, g≥i,χi−1A )∑
k′ pk′
∑
µi p(n
i = n|ci = c, ki = k′, g≥i,χi−1A , µi)p(µi|ci = c, ki = k′, g≥i,χi−1A )
(D19)
=
pk
∑
µi p(n
i = n|µi)δ(µi, µik,gi)∑
k′ pk′
∑
µi p(n
i = n|µi)δ(µi, µik′,gi)
, (D20)
where in Eq. (D14) we use the decoy-state property, namely, p(yi 6= ∅, yi = y|ki = k, ci = c, ni = n, g≥i,χi−1AB , bi =
X) = p(yi 6= ∅, yi = y|ci = c, ni = n, g≥i,χi−1AB , bi = X) holds. This is because once gNsent is fixed, Eq. (B1) assures
that the total Nsent sending states have a tensor product structure which implies that the information of k
i is only
encoded in the ith sending system Bi, and the n-photon state in the system Bi is the same for any choice of ki. In
Eq. (D15) we use the assumption (B-2) in Sec. II B, in Eq. (D16) we recursively use the decoy-state property and the
assumption (B-2), in Eqs. (D17) and (D19) we use the Bayes’ theorem, and finally in Eqs. (D18) and (D20) we use
Eq. (B1).
In Eq. (D20), from Eq. (11), ∀i ∈ Sdet and ∀gi ∈ Giunt,
∑
µi p(n
i = n|µi)δ(µi, µik,gi) can be upper [lower] bounded
by e−µ
−
k [e−µ
+
k ] for n = 0 and
e−µ
+
k (µ+k )
n
n! [
e−µ
−
k (µ−k )
n
n! ] for n ≥ 1, which we denote by PoisU(n|k, u) [PoisL(n|k, u)].
With these bounds, 〈Sc,k,u,y,X〉det can be upper and lower bounded as
〈Sc,k,u,y,X〉det ≤pk
∑
n
PoisU(n|k, u)
∑
i∈Sdet
∑
gi∈Giunt
p(ci = c, ni = n, gi, yi = y|χi−1AB , yi 6= ∅, bi = X)∑
k′ pk′
∑
µi p(n
i = n|µi)δ(µi, µik′,gi)
δ(bi, X)
=pk
∑
n
PoisU(n|k, u)fc,n,u,y,X|det, (D21)
where we define the function
fc,n,u,y,X|det =
∑
i∈Sdet
∑
gi∈Giunt
p(ci = c, ni = n, gi, yi = y|χi−1AB , yi 6= ∅, bi = X)∑
k′ pk′
∑
µi p(n
i = n|µi)δ(µi, µik′,gi)
δ(bi, X) (D22)
and
〈Sc,k,u,y,X〉det ≥ pk
∑
n
PoisL(n|k, u)fc,n,u,y,X|det, (D23)
respectively. It is notable that Eq. (D21) represents a linear combination of {fc,n,u,y,X|det}n, and fc,n,u,y,X|det is
independent of k, which is crucial in the next discussion.
c. Step 3. Upper and lower bounds on 〈Sc,n=1,u,y,X〉det with {〈Sc,k,u,y,X〉det}k
In this step, we derive an upper and lower bounds on 〈Sc,n=1,u,y,X〉det with {〈Sc,k,u,y,X〉det}k.
(i) Upper bound on 〈Sc,1,u,y,X〉det
First, we derive an upper bound on 〈Sc,1,u,y,X〉det. From Eqs. (D21) and (D23), we have two inequalities:
〈Sc,k2,u,y,X〉det ≥ pk2
∑
n Pois
L(n|k2, u)fc,n,u,y,X|det and 〈Sc,k3,u,y,X〉det ≤ pk3
∑
n Pois
U(n|k3, u)fc,n,u,y,X|det. By
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combining them and using the conditions 1 > µ+k2 and µ
−
k2
> µ+k3 (which we actually imposed in the protocol),
fc,1,u,y,X|det is upper bounded by
fc,1,u,y,X|det ≤
〈Sc,k2,u,y,X〉det PoisU(0|k3, u)/pk2 − 〈Sc,k3,u,y,X〉det PoisL(0|k2, u)/pk3
PoisL(1|k2, u)PoisU(0|k3, u)− PoisU(1|k3, u)PoisL(0|k2, u)
. (D24)
Substituting the definition in Eq. (D22) gives the upper bound on 〈Sc,1,u,y,X〉det as
〈Sc,1,u,y,X〉det =
∑
i∈Sdet
p(ci = c, ni = 1, ti = u, yi = y|χi−1AB , yi 6= ∅, bi = X)δ(bi, X)
≤〈Sc,k2,u,y,X〉det Pois
U(0|k3, u)/pk2 − 〈Sc,k3,u,y,X〉det PoisL(0|k2, u)/pk3
PoisL(1|k2, u)PoisU(0|k3, u)− PoisU(1|k3, u)PoisL(0|k2, u)
PoisU(1|u). (D25)
Here, we define PoisU(1|u) = ∑k∈K pkPoisU(1|k, u).
(ii) Lower bound on 〈Sc,1,u,y,X〉det
Next, we derive a lower bound on 〈Sc,1,u,y,X〉det. For this, we first use Eqs. (D21) and (D23), and we have three
inequalities:
eµ
−
k2 〈Sc,k2,u,y,X〉det ≤ eµ
−
k2pk2
∑
n
PoisU(n|k2, u)fc,n,u,y,X|det,
eµ
+
k3 〈Sc,k3,u,y,X〉det ≥ eµ
+
k3pk3
∑
n
PoisL(n|k3, u)fc,n,u,y,X|det,
eµ
+
k1 〈Sc,k1,u,y,X〉det ≥ eµ
+
k1pk1
∑
n
PoisL(n|k1, u)fc,n,u,y,X|det. (D26)
By combining the first two inequalities, it is easy to show that
(µ+k2 − µ−k3)fc,1,u,y,X|det ≥
eµ
−
k2 〈Sc,k2,u,y,X〉det
pk2
− e
µ+k3 〈Sc,k3,u,y,X〉det
pk3
−
∞∑
n=2
(µ+k2)
n − (µ−k3)n
n!
fc,n,u,y,X|det. (D27)
If we assume µ−k1 > µ
+
k2
+ µ+k3 (which we actually imposed in the protocol), we have that (µ
−
k1
)2[(µ+k2)
n − (µ−k3)n] ≤
[(µ+k2)
2 − (µ−k3)2](µ−k1)n holds for n ≥ 2 [45]. Therefore, Eq. (D27) leads to
(µ+k2 − µ−k3)fc,1,u,y,X|det ≥
eµ
−
k2 〈Sc,k2,u,y,X〉det
pk2
− e
µ+k3 〈Sc,k3,u,y,X〉det
pk3
− (µ
+
k2
)2 − (µ−k3)2
(µ−k1)
2
∞∑
n=2
(µ−k1)
n
n!
fc,n,u,y,X|det,
(D28)
which is equivalent to
fc,1,u,y,X|det ≥
µ−k1
(µ+k2 − µ−k3)(µ−k1 − µ+k2 − µ−k3)
[eµ−k2 〈Sc,k2,u,y,X〉det
pk2
− e
µ+k3 〈Sc,k3,u,y,X〉det
pk3
− (µ
+
k2
)2 − (µ−k3)2
(µ−k1)
2
( ∞∑
n=0
(µ−k1)
n
n!
fc,n,u,y,X|det − fc,0,u,y,X|det
)]
. (D29)
If we assume 1 > µ+k1 (which we actually imposed in the protocol), by using in Eq. (D29), the third inequality in
Eq. (D26) and the definition of fc,1,u,y,X|det in Eq. (D22), we obtain the lower bound on 〈Sc,1,u,y,X〉det as a function
of {〈Sc,k,u,y,X〉det}k as
〈Sc,1,u,y,X〉det ≥
µ−k1Pois
L(1|u)
(µ+k2 − µ−k3)(µ−k1 − µ+k2 − µ−k3)
{eµ−k2 〈Sc,k2,u,y,X〉det
pk2
− e
µ+k3 〈Sc,k3,u,y,X〉det
pk3
− (µ
+
k2
)2 − (µ−k3)2
(µ−k1)
2
(eµ+k1 〈Sc,k1,u,y,X〉det
pk1
)}
. (D30)
Here, we define PoisL(1|u) = ∑k∈K pkPoisL(1|k, u).
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d. Step 4. Upper and lower bounds on Sc,n=1,u,det,y,X with {Sc,k,det,y,X}k
In this step, we finally derive the upper and the lower bounds on Sc,n=1,u,det,y,X with experimentally observed data
{Sc,k,det,y,X}k.
(i) Upper bound on Sc,1,u,det,y,X
We combine Eqs. (D10) and (D12), which result from the application of the Modified Azuma’s inequality, with
Eq. (D25) to derive the upper bound on Sc,1,u,det,y,X .
Sc,1,u,det,y,X ≤ SUc,1,u,det,y,X :=
[Sc,k2,det,y,X+gMA(
c,k2,u,y,X
MA ,p
B
X ,Ndet)]Pois
U(0|k3,u)
pk2
− [S
−
c,k3,u,det,y,X
−gMA(c,k3,u,y,XMA ,pBX ,Ndet)]PoisL(0|k2,u)
pk3
PoisL(1|k2, u)PoisU(0|k3, u)− PoisU(1|k3, u)PoisL(0|k2, u)
× PoisU(1|u) + gMA(c,1,u,y,XMA , pBX , Ndet) (D31)
except for error probability
c,1,u,y,XU :=
∑
k=k2,k3
c,k,u,y,XMA + 
c,1,u,y,X
MA . (D32)
(ii) Lower bound on Sc,1,u,det,y,X
Similarly, we combine Eqs. (D10) and (D12) with Eq. (D30) to derive the lower bound on Sc,1,u,det,y,X .
Sc,1,u,det,y,X ≥ SLc,1,u,det,y,X :=
µ−k1Pois
L(1|u)
(µ+k2 − µ−k3)(µ−k1 − µ+k2 − µ−k3)
{eµ−k2 [S−c,k2,u,det,y,X − gMA(c,k2,u,y,XMA , pBX , Ndet)]
pk2
− e
µ+k3 [Sc,k3,det,y,X + gMA(
c,k3,u,y,X
MA , p
B
X , Ndet)]
pk3
− (µ
+
k2
)2 − (µ−k3)2
(µ−k1)
2
(eµ+k1 [Sc,k1,det,y,X + gMA(c,k1,u,y,XMA , pBX , Ndet)]
pk1
)}
+ gMA(
c,1,u,y,X
MA , p
B
X , Ndet) (D33)
except for error probability
c,1,u,y,XL :=
∑
k∈K
c,k,u,y,XMA + 
c,1,u,y,X
MA . (D34)
2. Lower bound on SZ,Z,1,u,det
Just by following the same arguments that we use for the estimation of the bounds on Sc,1,u,det,y,X in Secs. D 1 a-
D 1 d, we find that SZ,Z,1,u,det is lower bounded by the following quantity:
SLZ,Z,1,u,det
=
µ−k1
∑
k∈K pkµ
−
k e
−µ−k
(µ+k2 − µ−k3)(µ−k1 − µ+k2 − µ−k3)
{eµ−k2 [S−Z,Z,k2,u,det − gMA(Z,k2,uMA , pBZ , Ndet)]
pk2
− e
µ+k3 [SZ,Z,k3,det + gMA(
Z,k3,u
MA , p
B
Z , Ndet)]
pk3
− (µ
+
k2
)2 − (µ−k3)2
(µ−k1)
2
(eµ+k1 [SZ,Z,k1,det + gMA(Z,k1,uMA , pBZ , Ndet)]
pk1
)}
+ gMA(
Z,1,u
MA , p
B
Z , Ndet) (D35)
except for error probability
Z :=
∑
k∈K
Z,k,uMA + 
Z,1,u
MA + pfail. (D36)
Here, we define S−Z,Z,k2,u,det := SZ,Z,k2,det −Ntag.
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FIG. 5: Schematic representation of the virtual protocol for the case Nsent = 4. For each i, Alice first sends the system B
i to
Bob via the quantum channel. The eavesdropper performs an arbitrary operation on this system, and sends the system B′i
to Bob. Bob applies to the systems received the filter operation Fˆ , and we classify the events into two cases depending on
whether this filter operation is successful (the set of such successful events is denoted by Sdet, in the example Sdet = {1, 4}) or
not. For the successful events, Alice and Bob perform a joint measurement on the systems N i, Gi, Ai(Ci) and B′i depending if
the outcomes of N i and Gi are ni = 1 and gi ∈ Giunt (ni 6= 1 or gi /∈ Giunt), respectively. For the failure events, Alice performs
a measurement on the systems N i, Gi and Ci. In any case, once they have performed their measurements, Alice and Bob
announce the relevant classical information (CI) over an authenticated public channel. This is illustrated with a dashed line
in the figure. We can use this virtual protocol to prove the security of the actual protocol because the quantum and classical
information that is accessible to Eve coincide in both cases (see Proposition 1).
Appendix E: Derivation of the phase error rate
In this Appendix, we derive an upper bound on the phase error rate eph|Z,Z,1,u,det = Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det/SZ,Z,1,u,det. Im-
portantly, the procedure introduced below is valid against coherent attacks. To derive an upper bound on eph|Z,Z,1,u,det,
we need to obtain an upper bound on the number of phase errors Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det. Below, in the first subsection, we
explain the derivation of Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det with the restricted phase intervals in Eq. (22), and in the second subsection,
we explain how to obtain Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det with the general phase intervals in Eq. (10) from that with the restricted
phase intervals.
1. Derivation of Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det with restricted phase intervals in Eq. (22)
First, from Eq. (B1), we have that the total Nsent states can be expressed as
∑
gNsent
√
p(gNsent)|gNsent〉GNsent
Nsent⊗
i=1
|Ψigi〉CiKiNiBi |θici,gi , µiki,gi〉ΘiMi (E1)
with
|Ψigi〉CiKiNiBi :=
∑
ci,ki
√
p(ci)p(ki)|ci, ki〉CiKi
∑
ni
√
p(ni|µiki,gi)|ni〉Ni |Υˆi(θici,gi , ni)〉Bi . (E2)
In particular, |Υˆi(θici,gi , 1)〉Bi can be expressed as
|Υˆi(θici,gi , 1)〉Bi = (|1〉Ri |0〉Si + eiθ
i
ci,gi |0〉Ri |1〉Si)/
√
2, (E3)
and we define the eigenstates of the Y basis as |Y 〉Bi := |1〉Ri |0〉Si and |Y ⊥〉Bi := |0〉Ri |1〉Si , the ones of the Z basis are
|Z〉 := (|Y 〉+ |Y ⊥〉)/√2 and |Z⊥〉 := (−i|Y 〉+i|Y ⊥〉)/√2, and the ones of the X basis are |X〉 := (|Z〉+ |Z⊥〉)/√2 and
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|X⊥〉 := (|Z〉 − |Z⊥〉)/√2. This means that the state |Υˆi(θici,gi , 1)〉Bi can be rewritten in terms of the Z eigenstates
as |Υˆi(θici,gi , 1)〉Bi = eiθ
i
ci,gi
/2
(cos
θi
ci,gi
2 |Z〉Bi + sin
θi
ci,gi
2 |Z⊥〉Bi).
For convenience, we describe Alice’s state preparation process of |Ψigi〉CiKiNiBi for gi ∈ Giunt and ni = 1 by means
of an entanglement-based scheme. That is, we assume that she first generates the state
|Ψigi,1〉CiKiBi :=
∑
ki
√
p(ki)p(1|µiki,gi)|ki〉Ki
[√
pAZ |ψiZ(θi0Z ,gi , θi1Z ,gi)〉CiBi +
√
pAXe
−iθi
0X,g
i/2|0X〉Ci |Υˆi(θi0X ,gi , 1)〉Bi
]
(E4)
with |ψiZ(θi0Z ,gi , θi1Z ,gi)〉CiBi :=
∑1
x=0 e
−iθi
xZ,g
i/2|xZ〉Ci |Υˆi(θixZ ,gi , 1)〉Bi/
√
2, and afterwards she measures the system
Ci to obtain ci. In this subsection, given ci = c and gi ∈ Giunt, we suppose that θic,gi lies in the following interval for
any i:
θi0Z ,gi ∈ R0Zph = [−θ, θ], θi1Z ,gi ∈ R1Zph = [pi − θ, pi + θ], θi0X ,gi ∈ R0Xph =
[pi
2
− θ, pi
2
+ θ
] (
with 0 ≤ θ < pi
6
)
. (E5)
To prove the security of the key generated from the Z basis, we follow the definition of the phase error rate. That is,
we consider Alice and Bob’s hypothetical measurements on their systems Ci and B′i (where B′i represents the system
Bi after Eve’s intervention) in the X basis given that Alice prepared the state |ψiZ(θi0Z ,gi , θi1Z ,gi)〉CiBi . In this virtual
scenario, we have therefore, that Alice sends Bob the state |ψivir,m,gi〉Bi with probability pivir,m,gi by projecting the
system Ci in the basis {|+〉Ci , |−〉Ci} with |±〉Ci := (|0Z〉Ci ± |1Z〉Ci)/
√
2, where
Pˆ [|ψivir,m,gi〉Bi ] =
trCi
[
Pˆ [|m〉Ci ]Pˆ [|ψiZ(θi0Z ,gi , θi1Z ,gi)〉CiBi ]
]
pivir,m,gi
=
Pˆ [|Υˆi(
θi
0Z,g
i+θ
i
1Z,g
i
2 , 1)〉Bi ] (m = +),
Pˆ [|Υˆi( θ
i
0Z,g
i+θ
i
1Z,g
i
2 + pi, 1)〉Bi ] (m = −),
(E6)
and
pivir,±,gi = tr
[
Pˆ [|±〉Ci ]Pˆ [|ψiZ(θi0Z ,gi , θi1Z ,gi)〉CiBi ]
]
=
1± cos θ
i
0Z,g
i−θi1Z,gi
2
2
. (E7)
For later convenience, we define
θi0vir,gi :=
θi0Z ,gi + θ
i
1Z ,gi
2
, θi1vir,gi :=
θi0Z ,gi + θ
i
1Z ,gi
2
+ pi. (E8)
Thanks to Proposition 1 below, we are allowed to evaluate the security of the actual protocol by using the virtual
scheme illustrated in Fig. 5. In particular, we consider a virtual protocol where for each signal emission, Alice can in
principle prepare the following state if gi ∈ Giunt and ni = 1 instead of |Ψigi,1〉CiKiBi as
|Ψigi,1,vir〉AiKiBi =
∑
ki
√
p(ki)p(1|µiki,gi)|ki〉Ki
[
4∑
αi=0
√
piαi,gi |αi〉Ai |ψiαi,gi〉Bi
]
, (E9)
where the system Ai is stored by Alice in a quantum memory. Here, the states {|ψiαi,gi〉}αi are defined as
|ψi0,gi〉 = |ψivir,+,gi〉, |ψi1,gi〉 = |ψivir,−,gi〉,
|ψi2,gi〉 = |Υˆ(θi0Z ,gi , 1)〉, |ψi3,gi〉 = |Υˆ(θ1Z ,gi , 1)〉 and |ψi4,gi〉 = |Υˆ(θ0X ,gi , 1)〉, (E10)
and the probabilities {piαi,gi}αi are given by
pi0,gi = p
A
Zp
B
Zp
i
vir,+,gi , p
i
1,gi = p
A
Zp
B
Zp
i
vir,−,gi , p
i
2,gi = p
i
3,gi = p
A
Zp
B
X/2 and p
i
4,gi = p
A
X . (E11)
Alice sends Bob the system Bi in Eq. (E1), and Eve performs an arbitrary operation on this system. On the receiving
side, thanks to the assumption (B-1) in Sec. II B, Bob can apply the filter operation Fˆ to the system B′i to determine
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whether he will have a detection event (yi 6= ∅) or not (yi = ∅) prior to selecting the measurement basis, which is
represented by the Kraus operators
{√
IˆB′i − Mˆ∅,
√
Mˆ∅
}
. Depending on this result, we classify all the emissions
into two types of events:
(i) a successful event (which is associated to the operator
√
IˆB′i − Mˆ∅),
and
(ii) a failure event (which is associated to the operator
√
Mˆ∅).
We denote the set of successful events by Sdet := {i|yi 6= ∅} where Sdet := |Sdet|. Afterwards, we consider that Alice
and Bob perform joint measurements on all the signals. In particular, for the successful event identified above as (i),
we suppose that Alice measures her systems N i and Gi, and if the outcomes are ni = 1 and gi ∈ Giunt, she measures
the systems Ai to obtain the outcome αi ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. If αi ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, then Bob measures the system B′i in the
X basis to obtain the outcome yi ∈ {0, 1}, and if αi = 4, then Bob measures the system B′i in the Z (X) basis with
probability pBZ (p
B
X) and obtains the outcome y
i ∈ {0, 1}. Also, among the successful events of the type (i), if ni 6= 1
or gi /∈ Giunt, Alice and Bob measure their systems Ci and B′i and obtain the outcomes ci ∈ C and yi ∈ {0, 1}.
For the failure event identified above as (ii), Alice measures her systems N i, Gi and Ci and obtains the outcomes
ni ∈ [0,∞), gi ∈ Giunt ∪ Giunt and ci ∈ C, respectively. Importantly, it can be shown that, from Eve’s perspective,
this virtual protocol is completely equivalent to the actual protocol given that Alice and Bob’s announcements and
classical post-processing are chosen appropriately.
Proposition 1 From Eve’s perspective, the virtual protocol described above is equivalent to the actual protocol, namely,
the quantum and classical information available to Eve are exactly the same for both protocols. Also, the correspondence
between classical information (ci, ki) and the quantum state in the actual protocol is identical to the one of the virtual
protocol.
Proof of Proposition 1. First, we show that Eve’s accessible quantum information is the same in both protocols.
The case of the tagged signal (ti = t) or non-single-photon (ni 6= 1) emissions is clear, as the quantum states sent by
Alice in both schemes coincide. Hence, the quantum information that is available to Eve is obviously the same in this
case. As for the untagged single-photon emissions, we have that in the virtual protocol Alice sends Bob the virtual
states [see Eq. (E9)], while in the actual protocol, she does not. Still, we have that also in this case Eve’s accessible
quantum information of the system Bi is the same between the two protocols because the following relation
trAiKi Pˆ [|Ψigi,1,vir〉AiKiBi ] = trCiKi Pˆ [|Ψigi,1〉CiKiBi ] (E12)
holds. To conclude, we show that Eve’s accessible classical information is also equal in both protocols. For the case
of the tagged signal (ti = t) or non-single-photon (ni 6= 1) emission event, since the quantum states are the same in
both the actual and virtual protocols, the classical information declared by Alice and Bob in both schemes coincide.
Hence, we only need to consider the equivalence between both protocols for the case of ni = 1 and ti = u. For this,
we suppose that after finishing each of their joint measurements, Alice and Bob announce the classical information
as follows. Whenever their measurement outcome on the system Ai is αi ∈ {0, 1}, Alice and Bob declare over an
authenticated public channel the Z basis. Also, Alice (Bob) announces the Z basis (X basis and its measurement
outcome) when αi ∈ {2, 3}. Finally, if αi = 4 and Bob’s basis choice is Z (X), Alice announces the X basis and Bob
announces the Z (X) basis and its measurement outcome. This way, it is easy to see that the classical information
announced in the actual and virtual protocols coincide. Furthermore, due to Eq. (E2), we can confirm that the
correspondence between the classical information (ci, ki) and the quantum state in the actual protocol is equivalent
to the one of the virtual protocol. This ends the proof of the Proposition. 
Thanks to this Proposition, the security statements that we derive for the virtual protocol can be applied as well
to the actual protocol.
Next, we describe the state of the ith systems Gi, Ci,Ki, N i and B′i from Alice and Bob’s point of view. Given
that Bob has finished measuring the (i − 1)th incoming pulse, Alice and Bob obtained the measurement outcomes
ζi−1 := (ni−1, gi−1,γi−1,yi−1) with γi being αi or ci depending on whether the measured system is Ai or Ci.
Once the outcome ζi−1 and g≥i are fixed, the operation acting on the system Bi is mathematically modeled by the
completely positive (CP) map Λi
ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i that includes Eve’s operation depending on the iterative information I
i−1
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announced by Alice and Bob up to the (i− 1)th trials. With this CP map, the state in the ith systems Gi, Ci,Ki, N i
and B′i is of the form
σˆζi−1,Ii−1
tr[σˆζi−1,Ii−1 ]
, (E13)
where σˆζi−1,Ii−1 is defined as
σˆζi−1,Ii−1 :=
∑
g≥i+1
p(gi−1, g≥i+1)Pˆ
∑
gi
√
p(gi|gi−1, g≥i+1)Λiζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i(|gi〉Gi |Ψigi〉Ci,Ki,Ni,Bi)

=
∑
si
∑
g≥i+1
p(gi−1, g≥i+1)Pˆ
∑
gi
√
p(gi|gi−1, g≥i+1)Aˆisi,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i |gi〉Gi |Ψigi〉Ci,Ki,Ni,Bi
 . (E14)
Here, the set of Kraus operators {Aˆi
si,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i}si acting on the system Bi depends on the measurement results
ζi−1 and the iterative information Ii−1 announced by Alice and Bob.
Let us now derive an upper bound on the number of phase errors Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det. For this, we consider the joint
measurement performed by Alice and Bob on the ith event with i ∈ Sdet. In particular, we are interested in the
probability of obtaining the measurement outcome ni = 1 on the system N i, the measurement outcome gi ∈ Giunt
(namely, ti = u) on the system Gi, the measurement outcome αi = α ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} on the system Ai, and the
measurement outcome yi = y ∈ {0, 1} in the X basis measurement on the system B′i given that Bob’s filter operation
Fˆ was successful. Such probability can be expressed as
p(ni = 1, ti = u, αi = α, bi = X, yi = y|ζi−1, yi 6= ∅)
=tr
{ ∑
gi∈Giunt
Pˆ [|1〉Ni |gi〉Gi |α〉Ai ]⊗ qαMˆy,X
σˆζi−1,Ii−1
tr[E i(σˆζi−1,Ii−1)]
}
=
∑
gi∈Giunt
∑
g≥i+1
p(gNsent)
∑
ki
p(ki)p(1|µki,gi)
tr
[
qαp
i
α,gi
∑
si(Aˆ
i
si,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i)
†Mˆy,X(Aˆisi,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i)Pˆ [|ψiα,gi〉Bi
]
tr[E i(σˆζi−1,Ii−1)]
=
〈
Cigiqαp
i
α,gitr
[
Tˆ iy,X,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i Pˆ [|ψiα,gi〉Bi ]
]〉
. (E15)
Here, we define E i(ρˆ) :=
√
IˆB′i − Mˆ∅ρˆ
√
IˆB′i − Mˆ∅
†
, Cigi :=
∑
ki p(k
i)p(1|µki,gi), qα := 1 for α ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and
q4 := p
B
X . Also, we define the operator Tˆ
i
y,X,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i as
Tˆ iy,X,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i :=
∑
si(Aˆ
i
si,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i)
†Mˆy,X(Aˆisi,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i)
tr[E i(σˆζi−1,Ii−1)]
. (E16)
In Eq. (E15), for convenience of notation, we have defined 〈A〉 := ∑gi∈Giunt∑g≥i+1 p(gNsent)A.
If we define N1,u,α,y,X as the number of events where Alice obtains the measurement outcome n
i = 1 on the system
N i, gi ∈ Giunt on the system Gi, αi = α ∈ {0, 1} on her system Ai and Bob obtains the outcome yi = y ∈ {0, 1} in the
X basis measurement on the system B′i, the phase error rate is defined as the rate at which Bob obtains the outcome
yi = α ⊕ 1 on the system B′i among ∑α=0,1,y=0,1N1,u,α,y,X . The phase error rate for the untagged single-photon
emissions can be expressed as
eph|Z,Z,1,u,det =
∑1
α=0N1,u,α,y=α⊕1,X∑1
α=0
∑1
y=0N1,u,α,y,X
=:
Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det∑1
α=0
∑1
y=0N1,u,α,y,X
=
Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det
SZ,Z,1,u,det
. (E17)
In the third equality, we use the assumption (B-1) in Sec. II B which states that the efficiency of Bob’s measurement
is the same for the bases Z and X. In Eq. (E17), the denominator can be estimated directly with the decoy-state
method. Next, we calculate an upper bound for the quantity Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det. For this, we first relate Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det
with the sum of the probabilities
∑1
α=0 p(n
i = 1, ti = u, αi = α, bi = X, yi = α ⊕ 1|ζi−1, yi 6= ∅) over i ∈ Sdet. This
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can be done by using Azuma’s inequality [42]; we obtain
p
(
Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det −
∑
i∈Sdet
1∑
α=0
p(ni = 1, ti = u, αi = α, bi = X, yi = α⊕ 1|ζi−1, yi 6= ∅) ≥ gA(Ndet, ph,Z,1,uA )
)
≤ ph,Z,1,uA ,
(E18)
where gA(x, y) :=
√
2x ln 1/y. From Eqs. (E15) and (E18), we have that Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det can be upper-bounded by
Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det ≤
∑
i∈Sdet
1∑
α=0
〈
Cigip
i
α,gitr
[
Tˆ iα⊕1,X,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i Pˆ [|ψiα,gi〉Bi ]
]〉
+ gA(Ndet, 
ph,Z,1,u
A ) (E19)
except for error probability ph,Z,1,uA . The first term on the rhs represents the transmission rate of the virtual
states |ψi0,gi〉Bi and |ψi1,gi〉Bi . To upper bound this quantity using the experimentally available data, we ex-
press tr
[
Tˆ i
α⊕1,X,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i Pˆ [|Υˆ(θic,gi , 1)〉Bi ]
]
for gi ∈ Giunt and c ∈ C, in terms of the transmission rates of the
Pauli operators IˆBi , XˆBi and ZˆBi . In particular, since Pˆ [|Υˆ(θ, 1)〉Bi ] can be decomposed as Pˆ [|Υˆ(θ, 1)〉Bi ] =
(IˆBi + sin θXˆBi + cos θZˆBi)/2, we have thattr[Tˆ
i
α⊕1,X,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i Pˆ [|Υˆi(θi0Z ,gi , 1)〉Bi ]
tr[Tˆ i
α⊕1,X,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i Pˆ [|Υˆi(θi1Z ,gi , 1)〉Bi ]
tr[Tˆ i
α⊕1,X,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i Pˆ [|Υˆi(θi0X ,gi , 1)〉Bi ]
 = M igi
 tr[Tˆ
i
α⊕1,X,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i IˆBi/2]
tr[Tˆ i
α⊕1,X,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥iXˆBi/2]
tr[Tˆ i
α⊕1,X,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥iZˆBi/2]
 , (E20)
where M igi := (
~V i0Z ,gi ,
~V i1Z ,gi ,
~V i0X ,gi)
T with (~V ic,gi)
T := (1, sin θic,gi , cos θ
i
c,gi), and where T represents the transpose
operator. To calculate tr[Tˆ i
α⊕1,X,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i IˆBi/2], tr[Tˆ
i
α⊕1,X,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥iXˆBi/2], and tr[Tˆ
i
α⊕1,X,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥iZˆBi/2],
we use information from the states that are sent in the actual protocol. In doing so, we can upper-bound the first
term of the rhs in Eq. (E19) as
∑
i∈Sdet
1∑
α=0
〈
Cigip
i
α,gitr
[
Tˆ iα⊕1,X,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i Pˆ [|ψiα,gi〉Bi ]
]〉
≤
1∑
α=0
pUα
∑
i∈Sdet
〈
Cigitr
[
Tˆ iα⊕1,X,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i Pˆ [|ψiα,gi〉Bi ]
]〉
=
1∑
α=0
pUα
∑
i∈Sdet
〈
Cigitr
[
Tˆ iα⊕1,X,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i
(
IˆBi/2 + sin θ
i
αvir,gi
XˆBi/2 + cos θ
i
αvir,gi
ZˆBi/2
)]〉
=
1∑
α=0
pUα
∑
i∈Sdet
〈
Cigi
∑
c∈C
tr
[
Γiα,c,gi Tˆ
i
α⊕1,X,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i Pˆ [|Υˆ(θic,gi , 1)〉Bi ]
]〉
≤
1∑
α=0
pUα
∑
c∈C
ΓUα,c
∑
i∈Sdet
〈
Cigitr
[
Tˆ iα⊕1,X,ζi−1,Ii−1,g≥i Pˆ [|Υˆ(θic,gi , 1)〉Bi ]
]〉
=
1∑
α=0
pUα
(
ΓUα,0Z
∑
i∈Sdet
p(ni = 1, ti = u, αi = 2, bi = X, yi = α⊕ 1|ζi−1, yi 6= ∅)/pi2,gi
+ΓUα,1Z
∑
i∈Sdet
p(ni = 1, ti = u, αi = 3, bi = X, yi = α⊕ 1|ζi−1, yi 6= ∅)/pi3,gi
+ΓUα,0X
∑
i∈Sdet
p(ni = 1, ti = u, αi = 4, bi = X, yi = α⊕ 1|ζi−1, yi 6= ∅)/pBXpi4,gi
)
. (E21)
In the first inequality, the parameter pUα (with α ∈ {0, 1}) is an upper bound on pi0(1),gi := pAZpBZpivir,+(−),gi , where
pivir,±,gi is defined in Eq. (E7), and these quantities are given by
pU0 = p
U
1 = p
A
Zp
B
Z (1 + sin θ)/2. (E22)
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In the first equality in Eq. (E21), the parameters θi0vir,gi and θ
i
1vir,gi
are defined in Eq. (E8). The second equality
in Eq. (E21) is due to Eq. (E20) and the parameters {Γiα,c,gi}α,c, which connect the transmission rates of the Pauli
operators to those of the actual states, are respectively given by [25]
Γi0,0Z ,gi(θ
i
0Z ,gi
, θi1Z ,gi , θ
i
0X ,gi
)
= sin
(
θi0Z ,gi + θ
i
1Z ,gi
− 2θi0X ,gi
4
)[
sin
(
θi0Z ,gi + θ
i
1Z ,gi
− 2θi0X ,gi
4
)
− sin
(−3θi0Z ,gi + θi1Z ,gi + 2θi0X ,gi
4
)]−1
,
Γi0,1Z ,gi(θ
i
0Z ,gi
, θi1Z ,gi , θ
i
0X ,gi
)
= sin
(
θi0Z ,gi + θ
i
1Z ,gi
− 2θi0X ,gi
4
)[
sin
(
θi0Z ,gi + θ
i
1Z ,gi
− 2θi0X ,gi
4
)
+ sin
(−θi0Z ,gi + 3θi1Z ,gi − 2θi0X ,gi
4
)]−1
,
Γi0,0X ,gi(θ
i
0Z ,gi
, θi1Z ,gi , θ
i
0X ,gi
)
=
[
1− cos
(
θi0Z ,gi − θi1Z ,gi
2
)][
cos
(
θi0Z ,gi + θ
i
1Z ,gi
− 2θi0X ,gi
2
)
− cos
(
θi0Z ,gi − θi1Z ,gi
2
)]−1
,
Γi1,0Z ,gi(θ
i
0Z ,gi
, θi1Z ,gi , θ
i
0X ,gi
)
= cos
(
θi0Z ,gi + θ
i
1Z ,gi
− 2θi0X ,gi
4
)[
cos
(
θi0Z ,gi + θ
i
1Z ,gi
− 2θi0X ,gi
4
)
− cos
(−3θi0Z ,gi + θi1Z ,gi + 2θi0X ,gi
4
)]−1
,
Γi1,1Z ,gi(θ
i
0Z ,gi
, θi1Z ,gi , θ
i
0X ,gi
)
= cos
(
θi0Z ,gi + θ
i
1Z ,gi
− 2θi0X ,gi
4
)[
cos
(
θi0Z ,gi + θ
i
1Z ,gi
− 2θi0X ,gi
4
)
− cos
(−θi0Z ,gi + 3θi1Z ,gi − 2θi0X ,gi
4
)]−1
,
Γi1,0X ,gi(θ
i
0Z ,gi
, θi1Z ,gi , θ
i
0X ,gi
)
=
[
−1− cos
(
θi0Z ,gi − θi1Z ,gi
2
)][
cos
(
θi0Z ,gi + θ
i
1Z ,gi
− 2θi0X ,gi
2
)
− cos
(
θi0Z ,gi − θi1Z ,gi
2
)]−1
. (E23)
In addition, the parameter ΓUα,c that appears in the second inequality within Eq. (E21) represents an upper bound
on Γiα,c,gi in the range of g
i ∈ Giunt. If the conditions stated in Eq. (E5) are satisfied, we have that these quantities
have the form [25]: ΓU0,0Z =
sin θ
sin θ+cos 32 θ
, ΓU0,1Z = Γ
U
0,0Z , Γ
U
0,0X =
1−sin θ
cos 2θ−sin θ , Γ
U
1,0Z =
cos θ
cos θ−sin 32 θ
, ΓU1,1Z = Γ
U
1,0Z , and
ΓU1,0X = − 1−sin θ1+sin θ . Finally, the last equality in Eq. (E21) is due to Eq. (E15), where we note that pi2,gi , pi3,gi and pi4,gi
are constant values [see Eq. (E11)].
The next step is to relate the sum of the probabilities
∑
i∈Sdet p(n
i = 1, ti = u, αi = β, bi = X, yi = α⊕1|ζi−1, yi 6= ∅)
with β ∈ {2, 3, 4} that appear in Eq. (E21) to the actual number of such events, which we denote by Sc,1,u,det,α⊕1,X
with c ∈ C 12. For this, we again use Azuma’s inequality [42], and we obtain
p
(
Sc,1,u,det,α⊕1,X −
∑
i∈Sdet
p(ni = 1, ti = u, αi = β, bi = X, yi = α⊕ 1|ζi−1, yi 6= ∅) ≤ −gA(Ndet, c,1,u,α⊕1,XA )
)
≤ c,1,u,α⊕1,XA (E24)
and
p
(
Sc,1,u,det,α⊕1,X −
∑
i∈Sdet
p(ni = 1, ti = u, αi = β, bi = X, yi = α⊕ 1|ζi−1, yi 6= ∅) ≥ gA(Ndet, c,1,u,α⊕1,XA )
)
≤ c,1,u,α⊕1,XA . (E25)
12 Note that β = 2, 3, and 4 correspond to the case c = 0Z , 1Z , and 0X , respectively.
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Now, if we combine Eqs. (E19), (E21), (E24) and (E25), we obtain the upper bound on Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det in Eq. (E17) as
Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det ≤
1∑
α=0
pUα
∑
c∈C
ΓUα,c
Sc,1,u,det,α⊕1,X + sgn(ΓUα,c)gA(Ndet, 
c,1,u,α⊕1,X
A )
p(c)pBX
+ gA(Ndet, 
ph,Z,1,u
A ) (E26)
except for error probability
1PH :=
1∑
α=0
∑
c∈C
c,1,u,α,XA + 
ph,Z,1,u
A . (E27)
Recall that Sc,1,u,det,α⊕1,X in Eq. (E26) is the number of instances where Alice emits an untagged single-photon using
the setting {c ∈ C, b = X} and Bob obtains a detection event with the measurement outcome α ⊕ 1 ∈ {0, 1}. These
quantities are not directly observed in the experiments, and hence we need to estimate them with the decoy-state
method, as we have explained in Appendix D. Importantly, this has to be done in such a way that one obtains an
upper-bound on Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det. In the case of Sc,1,u,det,α⊕1,X , we take the following upper or lower bounds, depending
on the sign of ΓUα,c, such that Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det takes its upper bound:
SUc,1,u,det,α⊕1,X if Γ
U
α,c > 0, (E28)
SLc,1,u,det,α⊕1,X if Γ
U
α,c ≤ 0, (E29)
where SUc,1,u,det,α⊕1,X and S
L
c,1,u,det,α⊕1,X are defined in Eqs. (D31) and (D33), respectively. By substituting Eqs. (E28)
and (E29) into the rhs of Eq. (E26), we obtain NUph,Z,Z,1,u,det.
Finally, we calculate the failure probability associated to the estimation of the upper bound on Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det
conditioned on ntag ≤ Ntag and Sdet = Ndet, which we denote by PH. It is given by the sum of 1PH in Eq. (E27) and
2PH that is the sum of the failure probabilities associated to the estimation of {Sc,1,u,det,α,X}α=0,1,c∈C :
PH = 
1
PH + 
2
PH. (E30)
The parameter 2PH has the form 
2
PH =
∑
α=0,1
∑
c∈C 
c,1,u,α,X with c,1,u,α,X being the failure probability associated
to the estimation of Sc,1,u,det,α,X in Eq. (E28) or Eq. (E29), namely, 
c,1,u,α,X = c,1,u,α,XU or 
c,1,u,α,X = c,1,u,α,XL
depending on whether we use the upper or the lower bound.
2. Derivation of Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det with general phase intervals in Eq. (10)
In this subsection, we describe the expression of the upper bound on the number of phase errors Nph,Z,Z,1,u,det with
the general phase intervals that are shown in Eq. (10):
R0Zph = [θ
L
0Z , θ
U
0Z ], R
1Z
ph = [θ
L
1Z , θ
U
1Z ], R
0X
ph = [θ
L
0X , θ
U
0X ], (E31)
where −pi6 < θL0Z ≤ 0, 0 ≤ θU0Z < pi6 , 5pi6 < θL1Z ≤ pi, pi ≤ θU1Z < 7pi6 , pi3 < θL0X ≤ pi2 , and pi2 ≤ θU0X < 2pi3 . In the estimation
of the number of phase errors, the difference of the phase interval is only reflected in the upper bounds {ΓUα,c}α=0,1,c∈C
on {Γiα,c,gi}α=0,1,c∈C in Eq. (E23) and {pUα}α=0,1 in Eq. (E22), and hence we just need to replace {ΓUα,c}α=0,1,c∈C and
{pUα}α=0,1 in Eq. (E26). The explicit replacements can be obtained by considering partial difference functions of
Γiα,c,gi in Eq. (E23) with respect to {θic,gi}c∈C and by deriving the parameters {θic,gi}c∈C to achieve the maximum of
Γiα,c,gi . {pUα}α=0,1 can be obtained in a similar way. The results are summarised as follows.
ΓU0,0Z → Γi0,0Z ,gi(θL0Z , θL1Z , θU0X ), ΓU0,1Z → Γi0,1Z ,gi(θU0Z , θU1Z , θL0X ), ΓU0,0X → maxx,y,z∈{L,U}{Γ
i
0,0X ,gi
(θx0Z , θ
y
1Z
, θz0X )},
ΓU1,0Z → Γi1,0Z ,gi(θU0Z , θL1Z , θL0X ), ΓU1,1Z → Γi1,1Z ,gi(θU0Z , θL1Z , θU0X ),
ΓU1,0X →

Γi1,0X ,gi(θ
L
0Z , θ
U
1Z , θ
U
0X ) if θ
U
0X <
θL0Z
+θU1Z
2 ,
Γi1,0X ,gi
(
θL0Z , θ
U
1Z ,
θL0Z
+θU1Z
2
)
if
θL0Z
+θU1Z
2 ∈ R0Xph ,
Γi1,0X ,gi(θ
L
0Z , θ
U
1Z , θ
L
0X ) if
θL0Z
+θU1Z
2 < θ
L
0X ,
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pU0 →
1 + cos
θU0Z
−θL1Z
2
2
, pU1 →
1− cos θ
L
0Z
−θU1Z
2
2
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